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ABSTRACT
This thesis calls attention to a form of inequality less generally mentioned by
planners than inequality in earned income or in capital assets, but more directly linked
than those to planning practice: inequality in access to information. By exploring how
institutions interact in the peripheral land conversion process (e.g. the location permit), I
will describe how lack of information has affected the land market.
The government of Indonesia issues a location permit as a prerequisite for
developers entering the formal housing market. This permit is meant to facilitate
developers in acquiring and converting rural land, and gives developers an exclusive right
to purchase land in a certain area.
In practice, the location permit gives problematic results and has not
accomplished what it was intended to. First, although the location permit has facilitated
the developers, several studies have suggested that the permit has given developers a
monopsonistic position and has caused land to be held off from the market. Second, the
permit has not been effective as a tool for development. As an example 1) the new
development is fragmented, and uncoordinated, and 2) developers have not build housing
according to the requirements of the permit, a proportion of 1:3:6 (high : middle : low
income housing). Third, contrary to the requirement to acquire land directly from the land
owners, Real Estate Indonesia claims that about 90% of developers acquire land through
brokers (calo tanah).
I look more closely into the institutions involved in the land acquisition process.
Brokers (calo tanah) play a great role in the land conversion process. My argument is that
lack of information and knowledge on land markets is one of the reasons why brokers
have become so dominant in the process. In the situation of lack of information, brokers
have been able to fill this gap. Although brokers play an essential role in identifying and
assembling land in the periphery, lack of information on market prices has enabled them
to use the location permit as a vehicle to capture huge profits.
Thesis advisor: Dr. Bruce Ferguson
Title: Visiting Lecturer
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GLOSSARY
Bappeda
Botabek
BPN
calo tanah
camat
desa
dusun
girik
ha
Ijin lokasi
Ijin prinsip
Jabotabek
jaro
kampung
Kantor Pertanahan Daerah
Kasiba
kabupaten
kecamatan
kotamadya
lurah
ojek
pak
Pakto 2/1993
Perum Perumnas
PMDN
pola dasar
propinsi
REl
RT (rukun tetangga)
R UTR
RW (rukun warga)
tokoh masyarakat
UUPA 1960
Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah /Local
planning office
refers to the three districts surrounding Jakarta: Bogor-
Bekasi-Tangerang
Badan Pertanahan Nasional (National Land
Office/Ministry of Agraria)
land broker, also called mediator
sub-district head
village
sub-village
a customary land title that if registered is equivalent to
ownership title (hak milik)
hectare (1 hectare = 2.47 acre)
location permit
principal permit
abbreviation for Jakarta-Bogor-Tangerang-Bekasi
sub-village head
village housing cluster
Local Land Office
Kawasan Siap Bangunan/ ready-to-use sites
regency
district
municipality
village head
motorcycle transportation mode
Mister
Paket Deregulasi no. 2/23 October 1993
Deregulation Package
Perusahaan Umum Pembangunan Perumahan Nasional
The National Housing Corporation
Peraturan Menteri Dalam Negeri
Ministry of Home Affairs Regulation
structure map
province
Real Estate Indonesia (developers' association)
community association (smaller than RW)
Rencana Umum Tata Ruang (Spatial Plan)
neighborhood association
informal community leader
Undang-undang Pokok Agraria 1960/
The Basic Agrarian Law (BAL 1960)
Decentralization
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
KECAMATAN
Sub-District Head
VILLAGE
Lurah / Village Head -- LKMD
Structure of Regional and Local Administration
SOURCE: Nick Devas in Financing Local Government in Indonesia. Ohio University Monograph in
International Studies. Southeast Asia Series no. 84. Ohio, Athens, 1989.
NOTE:
DPR/MPR
DPRD I
DPRD II
Kanwil
Kandep
Dinas
LKMD
People's Representative Council
People's Local Representative Council Level I (Provincial)
People's Local Representative Council Level II (KabupatenKotanadya)
Kantor Wilayah/Local office of central ministry in province
Kantor Departemen/ Local office of central ministry in Kotanadya Kabupaten
Local Government Level I and II (Provincial or Kabupaten Koiamadya) Department
Agency
Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat Desa Village Council
Deconcentration
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
Indonesian newspapers have been filled with anecdotes on increasing land prices,
land disputes, problems in land appropriation and developers pressure on land owners to
sell their land. While Perum Perumnas (The National Housing Corporation) complains
that it is difficult to find cheap land for affordable housing, sanctions that require
developers to build affordable housing are not being enforced. Middle-income people
have to pay developers high prices for formal housing and appear increasingly priced out
of the market, yet small landowners appear to be selling their property to developers at
below-market prices. Some studies suggest that location permits give developers
monopsonistic controls over land, decrease land supply, raise land prices to the final
consumers, and disrupt the land market in other ways (Hoffman and Ferguson, 1992).
The Indonesian government mainly uses the location permit to facilitate land
acquisition by private developers who convert rural land to urban use in the peripheries of
its major cities. This permit gives a developer the exclusive right to acquire land within
the permitted area. The location permit is a prerequisite for any developer or company
intending to acquire land exceeding 5 hectares for housing development.
Location permits are most often granted in areas where there are already land
owners. According to Hoffman (1990) unlike other landowners in the urban fringe, the
landowners within the location permit are faced with distinctive constraints. For example,
landowners in the urban fringe have the opportunity to keep their property or sell at
market price. In contrast, most landowners within a location permit are (1) either
pressured to sell even when they do not want to, (2) forced to sell at below market prices,
or (3) if they do not sell to the permit holder, they will find it difficult to sell their land to
Team set u
Tangerang
TANGERANG (JPi: A
team has been set up to inves-
tigate reports about the ille-
gal transfer of rights to 110
hectares of state land in
Tigaraksa district here.
"The investigation is not
yet completed, but the regen-
cy has not lost (ownership) of'
the land,' Ismet Iskandar,
first assistant to the secretary
of the regency, said Saturday.
The teai consists of offi-
cials from a number of agen-
cies. including the Tangerang
office of the National Land
Agency, and heads of the
villages affected by the ap-
propriation of land for the
development of a new capital
of the regency.
He told The Jakarta Post
that the land has been di-
vided into a number of small-
p to handle
land dispute
er plots that make dentifica-
tion of the rig ht ful owne rs
(ifficult.
The case of the -missing'
land was reported following
the appropriation of 3.000
hectares of land in Tigaraksa
1 PT Panca Wira Sakti. The
companV has obtained a
license to develop the area
into the new capital of Tange-
rang regency.
Apart froin appropriating
the land, the company has
built various facilities for the
planned capital. including a
nearbv I 00-hectare golC
course near Tapos village. It
has also prepared ready-to-
build plots to be sold at be-
tween Rp 40,000 and Rp
60.000 (US$19.12 and $28.68)
per square meter. (13/tem)
Figure 1.1 Jakarta Post, July 12, 1993
another party. Hoffman recorded in his research that one farmer in the Jabotabeki area
stated that he did not want to sell his land, but sold it anyway because the village head
said that he should. Location permits appear to seriously constrain the operation of urban
land markets.
1.2 Objectives
This thesis calls attention to a form of inequality less generally mentioned by
planners than inequality in earned income or in capital assets, but more directly linked
than those to planning practice: inequality in access to information. By exploring how
institutions interact in the peripheral land conversion process (i.e., the location permit), I
will describe how lack of information has affected the land market.
Originally, I started my research with the main questions of whether land owners
within the permitted areas were selling their land to developers at below market prices.
During field research, identifying the boundaries of the permit area was difficult. In
collecting data on land prices and trying to identify where the permitted areas were, I
realized that another problem was more seriously disrupting the land market; it was lack
of information. It was a surprise to me that one village office had no map of their village.
A few villagers complained that the location permit boundary was blurred. Different
sources gave different information on land prices. There was a high level of uncertainty
among the officials concerning the implementation of the permit. I began to explore the
outcomes of the regulation and how the institutions involved in the process have
interacted with this lack of information.
Farvaque and McAuslan (1992, p. v) defines land as a "unique commodity, which
is affected by the forces of demand and supply." Unlike other markets, ease of entry and
exit is closely controlled by local and national government policies. They describe a well-
IJabotabek is the abbreviation of Jakarta-Bogor-Tangerang and Bekasi. Botabek refers to those cities
surrounding Jakarta.
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functioning land market as characterized by 1) the levei of ease and entry into the system,
and 2) ease of carrying out land market transactions. Both depend on the availability of
adequate land information, secure tenure arrangements, and appropriate registration
mechanisms. They identified several problems in a non-performing land market: 1) over
centralization of management and administration; 2) inappropriate and inflexible
regulatory and framework; 3) lack or inappropriate use of resource and political will to
tackle problems; 4) administrative systems lacking efficiency, equity, accountability; and
5) a failure or reluctance to encourage participation from the urban poor.
1.3 Outline of thesis
I have arranged my chapters in a constructive way according to my own process of
understanding the problem. First, I describe what a location permit is. Second, I state the
quantitative results of my research; third, I show how the institutions interacted, and
fourth, I end with conclusions and recommendations. In chapter 1, I will briefly describe
the Jabotabek development including why I have chosen it as my case study area, the
method of research, and my main findings and conclusions. Chapter 2, will explain about
the location permit: how it came about and evolved, and its theoretical objectives. In
chapter 3, I will discuss my main findings in research. Chapter 4 will describe the
institutional aspects of the actors involved in the process and why local agents or brokers
(in Indonesian referred to as calo tanah) have been so dominant in the peripheral land
conversion process. I will give my conclusions, recommendations and explore some
future research topics that emerged from this thesis in chapter 5.
1.4 The Jabotabek development
Jabotabek is a term used to describe the greater Jakarta area and its three
surrounding districts in West Java, namely Bogor, Tangerang and Bekasi. The Jakarta
2005 Master Plan is guiding the city's growth towards the east and west boundaries,
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Major Location Permits issued:
Pantai Indah Kapuk (800 11A)
Citraland Teluk Naga (1,000 11A)
i Bintaro (1,700 11A)
I Buni Serpong Damai (6,000 IIA)
5 Nodernland (770 11A)
Cikupa (700 1IA)
7 Tigaraksa City (3.500 I1A)
3 Lippo Village (500 11A)
Bekasi 2,000
10 Lippo City (2,000 IIA)
II Cikarang Baru (5,400 HIA)
12 Royal Sentul (2,000 HA)
LE7ElD:
Figure 1.3 Comparison of Intended Zoning and Major Location Permits Issued in
Jabotabek.
mainly Bekasi and Tangerang. The major development occurs along the main corridor of
the Jakarta-Merak Toll Road (west), Jakarta-Cikampek Toll Road (east) and Jagorawi
Toll Road (south). The development of activities along these corridors form a ribbon
pattern. In the west axis, the growth is signified by the development of a new town, Bumi
Serpong Damai (6,000 ha), Central Research of Science and Technology (Puspiptek, 100
ha), housing estates such as Modern Land (700 ha), Lippo Village (500 ha) and the
Bintaro housing estate (1,700 ha). The government has issued location permits further
west, e.g., Cikupa Estate (700 ha) and Tiga Raksa City (3,500 ha). Small and medium
size housing estates, ranging from 5 to 200 hectares have mushroomed between these
larger developments. (see Figure 1.2)
Acquiring land is one of the main issues to accommodate development and the
main method is by converting rural land to urban use. According to Marulanda (1991),
the pressure of growth is reflected in the number of rural villages converted to urban
villages in the district of Tangerang and Bekasi in the past decade:
Table 1.1 Growth of Urban Villages
Year 1980 1990
Tangerang 19 urban villages 117 urban villages
Bekasi 6 urban villages 59 urban villages
Ferguson and Hoffman (1992) estimated the land appreciation in the urban fringe
averaged 20-33% between the period 1985-1989 (or 5%-8.25% annual increase). Real
estate brokers, developers and appraisers interviewed in the Urban Fringe Area Report
(1993) estimated land prices in the urban fringe to increase 30-50% per year. This report
further sites Perumnas' (The National Housing Corporation) experience in acquiring land
for their housing extension. The price of land adjacent to their site doubled within the
same year of their housing construction.
Figure 1.4 Paddy fields in Kecamatan Pondok Aren.
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This dynamic growth in Jabotabek led me to do my research in Kecamatan
Pondok Aren, Tangerang - one of the districts with the highest number of location
permits issued for housing.
1.5 General description of the case study
Tangerang is divided into kotamadya (municipality), and kabupaten (regency).
Kotamadya Tangerang consists of 8 kecamatans (districts) 2, and is headed by a walikota
(mayor). Kabupaten Tangerang consists of 15 kecamatans, and is headed by a bupati
(regent). Kecamatan Pondok Aren is one of the four districts in Kabupaten Tangerang
with the largest area (in terms of proportion to the village area) under location permits
(see Table 1.2). Unlike a closer kecamatan such as the urbanized Ciputat, kecamatan
Pondok Aren still has many areas between location permit areas that consist of farmland
(dry land and paddy fields) and informal housing.3 Pondok Aren's rural characteristic
allows a better view of the physical changes of the land conversion and the impacts of
the location permit.
Table 1.2 Location Permits Issued in Four Kecamatans in Tangerang until 1990 (in Ha)
Kecamatan 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 Total
LEGOK 0 0 0 5150.0 300 150.0 80.0 5680.0
SERPONG 25.0 36.6 3108 2465.0 20.0 193.7 1300 7148.0
CIPUTAT 88.7 117.8 220 147.5 31 81.2 71.0 25.5 35 817.7
PONDOK AREN 35.0 20 20.0 169 30.0 101.2 20 0 15 410.2
Source: Urban Fringe Area Study, 1993.
Note: The location permits in Kecamatan Legok and Serpong are concentrated in a consortium of ten
developers, engaged in the development of Bumi Serpong Damai New Town.
2 lndonesia is divided into 27 provinces. Each province is divided into kabupaten (regency) and kotamadya
(municipality). Kabupaten and kotamadya are divided into kecamatan, and kecamatans are divided into
kelurahan (urban village) or desa (rural villages). For further information on regional and local government
structure, read "Financing Local Governments in Indonesia", by Nick Devas (1988).
3This is one of the criteria that I set-up for my case study area.
1.6 Method of research
The main methods of gathering information were 1) a review of secondary data, 2)
direct observations to the case study area, and 3) unstructured and structured interviews.
During the field research period (January 1994), I was able to interview about 35 people,
including government officials from the institutions involved in the location permit process
(i.e., Ministry of Agraria, local planning office, local land office, village officials), Real
Estate Indonesia (developers' association), consultants, developers, legal land experts,
property appraisers, landowners and brokers. I was assisted by two surveyors (one acted as
a guide since he lives in a nearby village and knows many landowners and brokers), who
helped me collect the data and interview landowners and brokers. The interviews were
based on questionnaires I had prepared, with the purpose of finding quantitative data on
land prices, and qualitative data on the perceptions and problems in the land transaction
process. The reliability of all this information is questionable because I was unable to find
sufficient hard evidence on the land transaction prices to support these figures. 4 The
samples I obtained from interviews with land owners were insufficient to do a statistic
analysis. These limitations meant I could not use the data quantitatively. Therefore, I will
use the data to gain a better understanding of the institutions involved in the land market.
The unstructured interviews focused on the process of developers' acquiring land,
the government's views on the peripheral land conversion process, and how the players
interacted with each other. The main difficulty in conducting this research was obtaining
data on land prices and identifying the boundaries of the location permits. Local officials
were reluctant to show the land transaction records. Developers were reluctant to reveal
their land costs and land acquisition process. Because of the sensitivity of the research
topic, several government officials refused to give information or reveal the problems of
4Dry land I is located within 500 meters of the main road and dry land 2 is located more than 500 meters
from the main road. These categories are usually used in rural areas to describe the type of land and relative
distance to the road. Infrastructure in these villages are minimum.
land acquisition. The local land office has a very unsystematic land recording system
where the location permits are only shown by numbers. To see the exact location of the
permits, one would have to open the individual permit files. Village offices did not have a
detailed map of their area (or even any map of their area), making it difficult to identify
the landowners. The maps available were on a scale of I : 3,000 with minimum level of
detail that should accompany this map scale.
1.7 General findings
My main findings of this research is that lack of information has created serious
problems in the land market. Although it is not the only factor that disrupts the land
market, it is one of the most noticeable factors I found during research. First, there is a
lack of understanding and misperception of what the location permit is, and what its
intended objectives are. Second, information concerning the permit and land markets in
general, is unevenly distributed. In many cases, information is deliberately concealed.
Actors with more information are able to use the location permit as a vehicle to gain large
profits. These artificial bottle necks in the flow of information as disequalizing, prevents
the free flow of land into the market. Other factors that decrease the effectiveness of the
location permit are the weak administrative capacity of local governments, lack of
enforcing sanctions, and the fragmented planning.
Local government officials lack basic information required to conduct and
monitor the permit regulation, such as adequate maps on the existing land use,
information on land owners and boundaries of land ownership, future road and
infrastructure networks, the real demand for housing, and environmental constraints of
the area.
The government has yet to define several terminologies used throughout the
regulation, such as the "social function" of land, and the negotiation process
(musyawarah).5 A meaningful and contextual social function of land depends on a social
plan, and how the new development or land use affects and benefits society as a whole.
Developers lack information on land ownership within the permit area, which
makes it difficult for them to approach the land owners. Because local governments are
unprepared with detail plans of street patterns and infrastructure networks, developers
design their own site plans. Besides information concerning the location permit,
landowners lack basic information on land prices, the future land use of their land and its
opportunity cost. In many cases, they lack knowledge of their land rights and
administrative procedures related to land registration and transactions.
Land brokers or calo tanah (and often referred to as mediators) have been able to
fill the gap of information between land owners and developers. This finding contradicts
the regulation that developers must negotiate directly with land owners. Brokers act as an
extended agent of the developer. They identify land owners, negotiate with land owners
and to some extent, assemble land for developers. The unawareness of land owners on
land prices has enabled land brokers to obtain huge profits.
The following are recommendations to improve the processes of land acquisition.
First, increasing the level of information among the institutions involved in the land
conversion process, including a) creating a reliable method of land assessment, b)
disseminating information on land prices, land rights, and the land acquisition process
(regulations, administrative procedures), c) clarifying the process of musyawarah to land
owners and developers, c) improving the land cadastral system, clarifying land and permit
boundaries, d) decentralizing and simplifying land registration procedures to the
kecamatan level, and e) disseminating information on future land use and development
plans.
Musyawarah is a process of discussion among the community to reach an understanding or agreement.
Second, increasing the technical skills and capability of the administering officials
by a) providing technical training in land management and information systems to local
officials, and b) enforcing sanctions against non complying developers. Thiitl, preparing
a detailed land use plan, infrastructure plan and implementation plan that can be used as a
guideline for development.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE LOCATION PERMIT
2.1 The Indonesian Land Law
Any discussion on land regulations must start with the Basic Agrarian Law of
1960, or Undang-Undang Pokok Agraria 1960 (hereinafter referred to as BAL). BAL is
derived from UUD '45/article 33 (Constitution), which states that land has a "social
function", meaning that public interests must be put before private interests, but cannot
disregard the rights of the landowners, and that all land matters are controlled by the state,
as the representative authority of the people of Indonesia.
The state can transfer this right, referred to as Hak Menguasai Negara, which
includes the disposition, utilization, supply and conservation of land, to the local
authorities or community of customary law, as long as it does not conflict with state
interests and coincides with state regulations. (Harsono, 1960)
Although BAL abolishes the dualism of the previous land law (statutory/western
and customary) 6, it acknowledges the customary land law and incorporates it into the
BAL. All land with customary titles should be registered and converted into hak milik
(right of ownership), the strongest right to land. Legal bodies or corporations can hold all
the land titles derived from the BAL 1960, except for hak milik. Table 2.1 shows the land
rights established under BAL. The hak milik cannot be held by non-Indonesian citizens,
nor Indonesian or foreign corporations. Customary rights, such as girik, evidenced by tax
receipts and letters by local officials, can be registered as hak milik. Most rural land
6lndonesia was a Dutch colony for 350 years, up till 1942. Statutory law is applied to expatriates - the
Dutch, Europeans, the Chinese and the Indians. Customary law was not written down and varies between
communities and ethnic groups. In rural areas, the Dutch administration made use of the village head
(lurah) to control tax collection and tenancy arrangements. (Dale, 1988)
Table 2.1. Land Rights Established Under the Basic Agrarian Law of 1960
I. Hak Atas Tanah (Land Rights)
A. Primary titles (derived directly from the state)
1. Hak Milik
2. Hak Guna Bangunan
3. Hak Pakai
4. Hak Pengelolaan
5. Hak Guna Usaha
B. Secondary Titles (granted by other title holders)
1. Hak Sewa
2. Hak Usaha Bagi Hasil
3. Hak Menumpang
4. Hak Gadai
II. Hak Jaminan atas Tanah (Security Rights)
1. Hak Tanggungan
right of ownership
right of building
right of use
right of management
right of exploitation
right of lease
right of sharecropping
right of lodging
right of land pledge
right of security
Source: Struyk et al. 1990
holders have girik titles to their land, but due to the relatively high processing costs, have
not registered them as hak milik.
In interviews with villagers, besides the high administration costs, I found that
many landowners felt it was unnecessary to register their land because in their opinion,
girik shows strong proof of their ownership rights.
Since corporations are prohibited from holding the hak milik title, after buying the
land from the original land owners, these corporations must release the land to the state
(pembebasan tanah) before they can obtain another title to the land. The new title is the
master HGB (sertifikat induk HGB). See Figure 2.1.
2.2. The Location Permit
2.2.1 Historic Overview
As explained in section 2.1, the state can transfer their right to acquire land to
private companies as long as it supports a social function. PMDN no. 2/1976 regulates the
procedure of land appropriation by private corporations that support housing
development. These regulations control the procedure of acquiring land, while the
agreement law (hukum perjanjian) under the civil law (hukum perdata), controls the
rights and obligations of each party involved in the land transactions (Harsono, 1991).7
The above regulation underwent revisions, starting in 1987 when the government
issued PMDN no. 3/1987 in an attempt to decentralize the titling procedure. This
regulation stipulates that all real estate companies must acquire a land release permit and
location permit either from the local authority (if the land required for development is less
7 Harsono further argues that in practice, the actors involved have a misperception on the function of the
regulations. As an example, some people think that these regulations give the governor full legal authority
on land prices. According to the agreement law, landowners have the right to not accept the land price and
if landowners do not agree on the land prices, the developers must find another piece of land for
development.
GRANT OF
MASTER TITLE
REGISTRATION
OF MASTER TITLE
CONSULTATIONS
WITH LOCAL
OFFICIALS
LOCATION PERMIT
& PERMIT TO
RELEASE LAND
RELEASE OF LAND
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SPLITTING OF
MASTER TITLE
REGISTRATION OF
SPLIT TITLES
TRANSFER OF
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APPROVAL OF
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Source: Struyk et. al., 1990
Figure 2.1 Steps in Land Titling (Release and Granting)
than 15 hectares), or the provincial authority/governor (if the land exceeds 15 hectares). 8
Prior to this regulation, all application for housing development exceeding 2,000 square
meters had to go to the Governor.
2.2.2 Main Purpose and Objectives of the Location Permit
The policy rationale for the location permit was to give developers an incentive to
build housing. By giving the developers an exclusive right to acquire land, the
government expected developers to follow housing policies that required providing
affordable housing according to the proportion of high (1) : middle (3) : low income
housing (6).
The main purpose of the location permit is to designate an area for housing
development, which meets the local policies and development plans. In theory, the
location permit serves both as an incentive to promote formal sector housing development
and as a planning device to control development. The goal of the permit is to make sure
that: 1) future development complies with local development plans, 2) prime farmland is
avoided, 3) non fertile land is utilized, and 4) environmental pollution is avoided.
This permit forces the developer to communicate with the government agencies
that have a role in housing development, so that the developer can gain permission to
begin acquiring land for their project. The regulation further states that developers should
negotiate directly with the land owners and buy land through voluntary bargain and sale.
If the project supports a public function (such as roads, highways, school) the developer
may also use a Land Appropriation Committee. 9 If land owners are unwilling to sell their
land, the developer must offer them the option of resettlement or participating in a land
readjustment scheme. In chapter 3 and 5, I will explain the effects of the location permit
8The regulation further states that if the land is over 200 hectares, the governor must obtain the approval of
the Ministry of Home Affairs.
9 Ferguson and Hoffman also recorded that private developers use this committee to acquire land.
on its economic objectives, land use and environmental objectives, and administrative
consequences.
2.2.3 Streamlining the process: Pakto 2/1993
"The new policy on deregulation is a revolution in acquiring permits," said
Ciputra, one of the biggest developers in Indonesia, when speaking about the new
regulation to streamline bureaucratic procedures.10 Before the deregulation, his company
spent 2-3 years to get location permits.
Since October 1993, the government has revised the regulation for acquiring the
location permit. Unlike the previous procedure where the amount of land requested
determines which agency issues the permit, the new regulation (referred to as Pakto no.
2/1993) gives the local land office (Kantor Pertanahan Daerah Tingkat II) full authority
to issue location permits.I The local land office coordinates the relevant agencies to
evaluate the request (e.g., the local planning office, district office of Public Works, and
other technical departments). The amount of time to issue the permit is defined
maximum 12 working days and developers can only extend their permit once (per year).
The regulation only concerns administrative procedures for obtaining location permits
and land titling, and is mainly aimed at streamlining the process.12 All parts of prior
IlOnterview in Bisnis Properti, November 1993, page 74-76.
''This regulation is part of the central governments deregulation package to promote foreign and local
investment. The package consists of deregulation's for: 1) export and import, 2) import tariffs, 3) capital
investment, 4) permits, 5) pharmacy and 6) environmental impact analysis.
12 Up till 1993, many developers have complained that the process of obtaining a location permit is time
consuming. According to Hoffman (1991), the average length of time required to obtain a location permit in
Bogor, Tangerang and Bekasi respectively were 5.3 months, 8.3 months and 5.3 months - ranging from a
minimum of 0.5 months in Bogor and a maximum of 42.5 months in Tangerang. This lengthy process has
increased the carrying costs of the developer. The following table shows the length of time to obtain the
location permit (in months) :
Location Agency estimate Average Minimum Maximum
Bogor 0.5 - 1 5.3 0.5 24.8
Tangerang 0.5 - 1 8.3 1.4 42.5
Bekasi 0.5 - 1 4.9 0.8 14.6
regulations concerning those 2 issues are replaced by Pakto 2/1993. Since this new
regulation was recently issued, it is too soon to know whether the local land office will
enforce sanctions against non-complying developers. In the past, developers easily
obtained extensions on their permits even though they had not built anything.
Variations concerning coordination in issuing the location permit occur within the
Botabek area. For example, following the issuance of Pakto 2/1993, the local planning
office in Tangerang (Bappeda) requires developers to obtain a principal permit (ijin
prinsip) as a prerequisite before obtaining the location permit. The purpose of the
principal permit is to allow the local planning office more control over development. This
prerequisite is not required in Bogor or Bekasi. Since Tangerang's master plan only shows
land use zoning, and contains no information of a detailed infrastructure plan, this
prerequisite has not been effective. 13 I will explain this in more detail in chapter 5.
13The literature on land use planning shows that many plans cannot be implemented because they do not
contain the guidelines for its implementation and are not integrated with land management.
72
CHAPTER THREE
THE CASE STUDY
"Rising prices are only symptoms,
they are not the cause of urban problems."
Alan Walters (1983).
In this chapter, I will describe my field observations, interviews with land owners
and main findings on land prices. Access to information and connections play a major
role in the land conversion process. The unequal distribution of information has enabled
certain actors to gain profit from their knowledge and give them bargaining power. I
argue that the unequal distribution of information has caused a wide variance of land
prices and results in a situation where there is no market price.
3.1 The Case Study Area
There are 11 villages (desa) in Kecamatan Pondok Aren. 14 The field research
focused on Pondok Aren and Pondok Pucung Village. My research team (with the
assistance of a local village official) interviewed 24 land owners who had sold their land
between 1980-1994. In addition, we also interviewed five land owners that have yet to
agree to sell their land to a developer, one new land owner, two land owners in
resettlement areas, brokers (three in the case study area and one from another village),
three developers within the case study area, and two developers in other kecamatans. In
addition, I also observed the development of Bumi Serpong Damai (a 6,000 ha new town
development) located in an adjacent kecamatan, interviewed the developer, and a few
landowners who owned land within their permit area.
14Until 1993, Pondok Jaya village (the eleventh village) was part of Pondok Aren village.
-- - - Boundary of kecamatan (district)
---- Boundary of village
Figure 3.1 Case Study Area: Pondok Pucung and Pondok Aren Village
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The total area of Kecamatan Pondok Aren is 2,395.4 hectares, while Pondok Aren
village and Pondok Pucung village total 224.4 hectares and 292 hectares respectively. The
total population in kecamatan Pondok Aren has grown from about 65,000 in 1988 to
113,029 in 1992. The population in Pondok Aren village in 1993 was 7,330 made up of
1940 households, while Pondok Pucung village has a population of 7,656. The general
land use plan for both villages is for residential development. Infrastructure services are
basic, with no connection to the main water supply system.
3.2 Developers with Location Permits
The area under location permits amount to about 60% of each of the village's total
area. Table 2.2 and 2.3 show the list of housing developers and the area under their
location permits. Of the 7 developers in those two villages, two developers are still
expanding their housing development, and have received permit extensions. Despite
regulations, one developer has left its land idle for 12 years,15 with no sanctions enforced
against them. It is too soon to know the results of the new regulation to limit extension of
the permit to one year, since it was issued October 1993.
As explained in chapter 2, overlapping of permit areas is common. Three of the 7
housing developments are located within Bintaro's (a real estate company) permit area,
the largest housing development in these villages. Bintaro's total permit area is 1,700
hectares in 14 villages. They have purchased 1,000 hectares of land and developed 456
hectares.16 Out of the three, two developers obtained Bintaro's permission to develop that
land in 1982. As I will explain in the following paragraph, the boundaries of the permit
area are unclear.
15Although the regulation supposedly has a time limit on extensions, in practice developers can obtain
extensions on their permit if they can afford to pay (informal) fees. Large developers (> 500 hectares)
normally can do so.
16According to the developers, Pondok Indah (a real estate in South Jakarta), Bintaro and Bumi Serpong
Damai will be connected by the Serpong-Bintaro highway.
Permit area of Bintaro (village head's version)
------ Boundary of Bintaro's development plan
E9 Permit areas of other developers
El Location of sub-divisions
@ Location of Pak Ali's land
Figure 3.2 Unclear Permit Boundaries.
According to the village head of Pondok Pucung and Pondok Aren village, Bintaro's location
permit only covers 140 ha and 33 ha, respectively in each village. However, Bintaro's site plan
seems to include the whole village and almost all of kecamatan Pondok Aren. The numbers
inside the rendered area correspond to Table 3.1 and Table 3.2. They may not indicate the
boundary of the permit, but rather the area acquired by the developer.
Table 3.1 Developers with Location Permits in Pondok Pucung Village
Source: Pondok Pucung Village Office
PERMIT HOLDER NAME OF HOUSING ESTATE Permit Permit
Issued in Area
1. PT Bintaro Jaya/Jaya Property expansion of Bintaro Jaya 1979 140 ha
2. PT Duta Dharma Bakti Pondok Pucung Indah 1982 20 ha
T O T A L 160 ha
Total area of Pondok Pucung Village = 292.85 ha
% area under location permit = 54.6 %
According to the village head, Bintaro has already bought 56 hectares in Pondok Pucung.
Table 3.2 Developers with Location Permits in Pondok Aren Village
Source: Pondok Aren Village Office
PERMIT HOLDER NAME OF HOUSING ESTATE Permit Permit
Issued in Area
3. PT Bina Nusantara Raya Arinda I and II, Pondok Aren Indah 1982 12 ha
4. PT Bintaro Jaya expansion of Bintaro Jaya 1979 32 ha
5. PT Gembala Swasti Perumahan Wisma Pondok Aren N/A 5 ha
6. Karya Gemilang Taman Mangu Indah N/A 17 ha
7. PT Bina Bangun Pondok Lestari Palm Village 1985 24 ha
8. PT Japos Graha Lestari/ PT Villa Japos 1990 27 ha
Benua Birunusa
9. Kavling Pembangunan Mekar idle land 1982 24 ha
Utama (PMU)
T O T A L 131 ha
Total area of Pondok Aren Village =
% area under permit
224.39 ha
58.3%
Note: PT Bina Nusantara Raya obtained permission from Bintaro to acquire land in that area.
According to the lurah, PMU's permit is under Bintaro's permit. Bintaro is still negotiating to buy the land
from PMU. They are asking for a price 30% higher than Bintaro is willing to pay. I was unable to obtain
information on how much land was acquired by each developer.
Figure 3.3 Defining Property
After purchasing land, developers usually build a wall surrounding their property and
put up a sign.
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3.3 Problems in Defining Permit Boundaries
It was difficult to obtain information on the permit boundaries. The local land
office does not consider it as public information. The local planning office only has a
zoning map that shows designated residential areas with numbers representing the
developers with permits in the area (in Pondok Aren Village the whole area was
rendered as residential area). Each village office has different levels of information
regarding their own village. As an example, the village office of Pondok Aren village
had no map of their village.
The village head at Pondok Pucung had a larger scale map (1 : 3,000) of his
village showing the boundaries of two location permits areas in his village. This map
was different from the information that I obtained from the local planning office. In
addition, not all the developers I interviewed would show me their permit boundaries.
After several visits, Bintaro showed their site plans, which appear to include almost all
of kecamatan Pondok Aren in their design. This contradicting information creates
problems in land acquisition, especially for land owners that are presumably located
outside the permit area. The village head confirmed this confusion of permit boundaries.
He said that developers would often draw maps that include areas outside their permit
area. (See Figure 3.2)
The problem of unclear boundaries also hinders potential buyers who want to
enter the informal housing market.' 7 If the boundaries were unclear, this means that
areas that are actually outside the permit area can be mistaken for the permit area. Thus,
potential buyers might hesitate to buy land around housing estates. The problems I
encountered in obtaining information on location permit boundaries also confirmed that
171nformal housing markets refers to the housing market outside formal housing built by developers. It
includes legal subdivisions and housing built by individuals.
Source: Rencana Umum Tata Ruang Kecamatan Pondok Aren, 1993
Figure 3.4 Existing land-use in Kecamatan Pondok Aren (1993). The accuracy of this
map is questionable. Some of the land rendered as housing are idle land, and some of the
land rendered as rice fields are actually housing.
the lack of sufficient information is a more significant problem in the land market. My
research continued to explore the prices in this unbalanced land market.
3.4 Land Classification
When I asked information on land prices, local villagers asked me what kind of
land was I interested in buying. Normally, villagers refer to land types of dry land or
cultivated land (tanah darat) and paddy or rice fields (sawah). They also categorize the
land into classes, that generally refer to the soil type and distance from the main village
road. As an example, a parcel of land located more than 500 meters from the main village
road is classified as dry land II. If the land level was subject to flooding, that parcel of
land is classified as dry land IV, and the land price would be lower. This however is not
always true. In her study of 51 land transactions, Marulanda (1992) found several cases
where larger plots located further away from the main road were more expensive than
smaller plots located very near the main road. She also found two transactions in the
same village where even though the infrastructure provided is the same, the larger plot
got a higher square meter price. Usually, for land with the same characteristics, the larger
the plot the lower would be the price per square meter. During my interviews with land
owners, I found two parcels of land of different land types (dry land and paddy fields) that
were located near each other, sold to the same buyer for the same price (see Appendix 4,
land owner P1 and P2).
The bupati (head of kabupaten) issues official land prices every year. The land
prices are based on the existing land use and land quality, namely residential, farming,
commercial and trade, and industry in each village. Each category is broken down into
four or five classifications of land quality (I to V). In general, the official land prices in
one village are based on the distance of the village from the main city and the condition
of infrastructure. In my conversations with the various actors, the official land prices are
Table 3.3 Percentage Land Price Increase (1987-90, and 1990-93)
Real Land Price
Village Head's (lurah) version
1987 1990 1993
Dryland 1 72,173 97,314 120,000
Dryland 2 40,096 45,413 50,000
Paddy field 12,831 15,570 40,000
Broker I
1987 1990 1993
Dryland 1 8,019 58,388 80,000
Dryland 2 6,415 51,901 65,000
Paddy field 5,613 19,463 45,000
Broker 2
1987 1990 1993
Dryland 1 9,623 19,463 50,000
Dryland 2 8,019 16,219 45,000
Paddy field 6,415 12,975 40,000
Broker 3
1987 1990 1993
Dryland 1 8,019 19,463 55,000
Dryland 2 7,217 16,219 45,000
Paddy field 5,613 12,975 40,000
Developer
1987 1990 1993
Dryland I 17,642 28,545 57,000
Dryland 2
Paddy field 12,831 23,355 50,000
Percentage Price Increases
Village Head's (lurah) Version
1987-90 1990-93
Dryland 1 35% 23%
Dryland 2 13% 10%
Paddy field 21% 157%
Broker 1
1987-90 1990-93
Dryland 1 628% 37%
Dryland 2 709% 25%
Paddy field 247% 131%
Broker 2
1987-90 1987-90
Dryland I 102% 157%
Dryland 2 102% 177%
Paddy field 1020% 208%
Broker 3
1987-90 1990-93
Diyland 1 143% 183%
Dryland 2 1250% 1770
Paddy field 131% 208%
Developer
1987-90 1990-93
Dryland I 62% 100%
Dryland 2
Paddy field 82% 114%
Percentage Price Increases Per year
Lurah
1987-90 1990-93
Dryland 1 12% 8%
Dryland 2 4% 3%
Paddy field 700 520%
Broker I
1987-90 1990-93
Dryland 1 209% 120%
Dryland 2 236% 8%
Paddy 82% 44%
Broker 2
1987-90 1990-93
Dryland 1 34% 52%N
Dryland 2 34% 590
Paddy 34% 690o
Broker 3
1987-90 1990-93
Dryland 1 48% 61%
Dryland 2 42% 590
Paddy 440 69%
Developer
1987-90 1990-93
Dryland 1 21% 33%
Dryland 2
Paddy 27% 38%
1987 1990 1993
Exchange Rate 1US$= Rp. 1,650 Rp. 1,900 Rp. 2,100
Interest rate 21.67% 17.30% 21.03%
Inflation rate 8.90% 9.53% 9.70%
Difference 12.77% 7.77% 11.33%
CPI 62.35 77.07 100.00
mostly used as reference in public land acquisition and in assessing property taxes. The
village heads commented that official land prices are becoming more accurate over the
years.
The official land transaction records are an unreliable source to find the market
price. Marulanda (1991) cross checked 10 recorded land transactions, and found that 7
out of the 10 transactions recorded were more than 50% lower than the actual transaction
price. She also recorded that the purchaser and seller stated to have paid or received a
different square meter price, which indicates the involvement of a broker. The village
heads confirmed this information and said that the tendency to lower recorded
transaction prices is to avoid paying higher taxes.
3.5 Land Prices
I asked many different sources on price trends in their village. Their answers
reflected their experience and knowledge regarding land transactions (see Table 3.4). I
obtained information on land prices from the village head (lurah), brokers, developers
and land owners. The reliability of this information is questionable because I was unable
to find sufficient hard evidence on all the land transaction prices to support these figures.
The land prices obtained from my interviews with land owners were insufficient to do a
statistic analysis. Therefore, I will only use the data to gain a general understanding of
the land markets and the institutions that support the land conversion process, which I
will explain in detail in Chapter 4.
The village head's version reflected his judgment on the land prices of individual
sales within the village. Of the three brokers I interviewed in Pondok Aren village, two
gave similar land prices, based on their experience in buying land from original land
owners to be sold to one of the larger developers. They were both financed by an
investor in Jakarta. Broker #1 gave land prices based on his experience in individual land
transactions and transactions to a developer. All these brokers admitted that they gained
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Figure 3.5 Land Price Trends According to Different Actors (in real Rupiah)
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profit from increasing the land price to the buyer. I was unable to obtain direct
information from them concerning their profits, but I was able to obtain information
regarding land transaction prices from that particular developer, which was the largest
developer in that area. 18
3.5.1 Land Prices for Large Scale Housing Development
As mentioned above, one of the objectives of this thesis is to gain a better
understanding of the institutions involved in the land conversion process. Therefore, the
most sufficient data I obtained to discuss this process is the information from the
developer and from broker #2 and #3. Both brokers bought land from local land owners
in the same village to sell to the same developer continuously within a certain time
period. These brokers admitted that they tried their best to conceal the developer's
identity from the land owners. Appendix 4 shows the nominal and real prices of land
prices according to brokers and a developer, based on transactions between 1987 and
1993.
The developer confirmed that most of their land was purchased through brokers
and the information on land prices reflects the average purchasing price. In some cases
the brokers acted as mediators and the land transactions were done directly with the land
owners. In other cases the brokers bought and assembled the land before selling it to the
developer. On average, the developer bought the land at a much higher price than the
brokers bought from the land owners.19 The average price difference can be seen in the
following table:
18 PT Bintaro obtained its location permit in 1979. Their total permit area is 1,700 hectares. They began
their housing development in Ciputat, and gradually started expanding west and northwest, towards
Kecamatan Pondok Aren. In 1984-85, they were able to buy land for Rp. l,500-Rp. 2,000 per m2 (about
Rp. 3,600 in real price). In 1987, the average real land price increased to Rp. 15,237 per m2, and in 1990
and 1993, it increased to Rp. 25,950/m2 (70% increase) and Rp. 52,500/m2 (102% increase) respectively.
19This price does not reflect the total cost to acquire land. Developers must pay official fees to the village
and camat office, and informal fees to various actors involved in the process. Hoffman (1990) recorded
that informal fees in acquiring land amount to 20% of total development costs.
Table 3.4 Comparison of Average Land Price for Broker and Developer (in real rupiah)
Year Broker Developer Broker's Gain In percentage
Original Land Price Land Price
per m2 per m2
1 9 8 7 Rp. 7,484 Rp. 15,237 Rp. 7,953 106 %
1 9 9 0 Rp. 16,219 Rp. 25,950 Rp. 9,731 60 %
1 9 9 3 Rp. 45,833 Rp. 53,500 Rp. 7,666 16.7%
As we see in the above table, the brokers are getting less profit through the years.
One possible explanation is that the distribution of information concerning land prices is
becoming more transparent. As the housing development expands, land owners become
more aware of the demand for their land and are more informed of its opportunity cost.
Therefore, brokers must buy the land from the original land owners at a higher land price.
According to the developer, beginning 1990, land owners of paddy fields were unwilling
to sell their land at a lower price than dry land.20 This information explains why paddy
fields increased more rapidly at 69% per year compared to dry land, which increased 50%
per year between 1990-1993.
In the interviews with land owners, 2 out of the 24 land owners said that they
waited until the land price was "right", before they went to the developer to sell their land.
A common phenomenon in land conversion in the urban fringe is the "waiting game." 21
Land owners sell only part of their land, and wait until the land prices increase before
they sell other parts of their land to the developer. Marulanda (1992) also concluded that
many land owners assume that the new developments will overrun their properties and
that they tend to wait for the best offer to sell their land. Although 48% of the 51 land
owners she interviewed were farmers, they were not cultivating the whole parcel and had
only small scale gardening.
20 Several of the land owners I interviewed sold different types of land to a developer for the same price.
2 1According to Michael Kitay (1985), the waiting game is a result of urban land values. Land owners keep
parcels of urban land vacant until there is a dramatic boom in the selling price.
3.5.2 Price Trends
The information on land prices in individual transactions given by the village head
and broker 1 have the widest range of prices. Both estimations are higher than the land
prices given by the developer, broker 2 and broker 3. Individual land transactions occur
on smaller plots, which usually sell for a higher price per square meter than larger plots.
Since I could not obtain sufficient data on land prices to confirm the information from the
village head and broker, I can only speculate that the main reason for such a wide price
difference is the different level of information between the actors.
Price trends of land differ depending on the involvement of the actor. Brokers
provoke the highest price increases, while the village head version has the smallest
increase compared to the other versions (4%-12% p.a. between 1987-90 and 3%-52% p.a.
between 1990-93). In general, land price increases are highest and have the most widest
range between 1987-1990 (4%-236% p.a.).
According to the broker's and developer's land price estimation land in the urban
fringe area seems to be an attractive investment, and is increasing at a higher rate than
inflation. For the developer land prices increased 21%-27% p.a. between 1987-90 and
33%-38% p.a. between 1990-93, while for broker #2 and #3 land prices increased 34%-
48% p.a. between 1987-90, and 52%-69% p.a. between 1990-93. As a comparison,
interest rates in 1987, 1990 and 1993 respectively were 21.67%, 17.30% and 21.03%,
while inflation rates were 8.9%, 9.53% and 9.7%, respectively. (See Table 3.3)
3.5.3 Land Speculation
Information from two brokers gave evidence of land speculation. These brokers
were financed by an investor in Jakarta. They started buying the land when they obtained
information of Bintaro's plan to expand its development in kecamatan Pondok Aren. The
lag of time in building the housing estate and knowledge of future development plans had
allowed speculators to buy up land before developers. Before 1987, they bought various
A typical rural house made of wooden
structure with walls of traditional woven
bamboo called "gedek".
A small village housing cluster.
The market place in Kecamatan Pondok
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infrastructure are poor. Although
regulations require that developers provide
public facilities, they tend to caterto middle
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Figure 3.6 Existing village housing and market place in Kecamatan Pondok Aren.
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types of land (paddy fields, dry land) at the price of Rp. 4,000 to Rp. 6,000 per m2
(nominal rupiah). When the developer started to acquire land in that area, they were able
to sell the land at a much higher price, about Rp. 11,000 per m2 (nominal rupiah). I will
explain why brokers are able to buy land at such low prices in chapter 4.
Developers tend to conceal their development plans for reasons of avoiding land
speculations. In my opinion, this induces land speculation because information on
development is unequally distributed to land owners. Therefore, people with knowledge
of a certain development can take advantage of the information they have and buy up land
at cheap prices.
3.5.4 Concentration of Land Holdings
In general, the total number of land owners decreased from 2,503 in 1987 to 2,108
in 1990. The number of land owners with land under 500 m2 and between 500-1,000 m2
also decreased between 1987-1993. Land holdings between 1,000-2,000 m2 and greater
than 2,000 m2 showed opposite behavior. The number of land owners with land between
1000-2000 m2 increased between 1987 and 1990, while the number of land owners with
land greater than 2000m2 decreased. Between 1987-1990, the number of land holdings
between 1,000-2,000 m2 decreased, while the number of land holding greater than 2,000
m2 increased. In percentage, land holdings greater than 2,000 m2 are higher in 1990
suggesting that there are concentrations of land holdings.
Table 3.5 Composition of Land holdings in Pondok Pucung Village in 1987, 1990 and
1993
1987 1990 1993
Number of landowners 2503 100% 2276 100% 2108 100%
Composition of land holdings
< 500 m2 413 16.5% 413 18.2% 331 15.7%
501 < x < 1000 m2 1564 62 % 1365 60 % 1231 58.4%
1001< x < 2000 m2 301 12.5% 341 15 % 290 13.8%
> 2000 m2 225 9 % 177 7.8 % 256 12.1%
Source: Pondok Pucung Village Office
A new house built by a non-villager in the
surrounding area of a formal housing estate.
This house is built on sub-divided land
within a developer's permit area.
This is a low-income housing complex for
employees of a large batik company, PT
Batik Keris. The company provided plots
with minimum infrastructure.
Typical middle income housing provided
by a developer. The lot sizes for the above
houses are about 90 square meters.
Figure 3.7 Types of new housing that emerged in the urban fringe area.
3.6 Results of Questionnaires and Interviews
Fifteen out of the 24 land owners were unaware of the future land use plans for
their area. Two land owners sold their land to support the housing development. They
complained that the location permit boundaries were unclear and suggested that the local
government disseminate more information on it. Lack of financial resources was the main
reason for selling their land. It is common for rural land owners to sell parts of their land
to obtain additional income. Marulanda's study also confirmed that even though the
majority of land owners she interviewed were farmers, the fact that they have additional
income from selling land indicates that their land is not productive enough to secure their
living. The types of farming I observed were rice and small crops (fruits, corn, cassava,
etc.), which only covered a small portion of their land. Farmers would sell what ever they
grew. In one of my interviews, the sub-village head said that many of the villagers
worked as laborers on the new road constructions, or temporarily migrated to the city to
work as street vendors or day labor.
From the respondents' answers on why they needed money, most land owners
used the money to improve or build their homes, as capital for business or for family
reasons (school tuition, ceremonies, etc.). For these land owners, it seems that selling land
is the easiest way for them to obtain additional income. If they were to borrow from the
bank, they might not be able to obtain a loan (bank regulations only allow registered land
with certificates as collateral) or pay back the installments.
In selling their land, two out of the 24 land owners put up a sign in front of their
house. Fifty percent of the land transactions involved brokers and 9 out of 24 transactions
were to developers. Of the 9 transactions to developers, only two land owners went
directly to the developers.
Figure 3.8 Developers would have liked to buy the land along this main road, but many land
owners chose not to sell. These land owners (shown on the left side of the photo) have land
within the permit area. Some of the new housing development can be seen on the right side.
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3.6.1 Land Subdivision within Permit Areas
One land owner who had land within Bintaro's permit area, subdivided his land
and sold parts of it to individuals. Despite the fact that his neighbors sold their land to the
developer, this land owner had no problem selling his land to third parties. The parcels
were about 300-500 m2. The new land owner is building a house and had no problem
obtaining a building permit. He bought the land because of its location near Bintaro, and
it was much cheaper than buying land from the developer. The new land owner bought
the land in 1993 for Rp. 120,000 per m2. 22 As a comparison, Bintaro at that time was
selling serviced land for Rp. 450,000 per m2. The local planning office had issued the
building permit based on their judgment that it was unfair to deny someone the
opportunity to build a house. Since the parcel was under 2,000 m2 it did not require any
approval from the local authorities. The developer, on the other hand said that their land
acquisition team had overlooked this area, because they were concentrating land
acquisition in another part of the village. They also said that they will try to incorporate
the existing formal housing development into their future development plans through a
land readjustment scheme. (see Figure 3.7)
3.6.2 Bargaining power
The prices that the land owners receive depend on their bargaining power. Their
power, I argue is a function of 1) their knowledge and information on the land market, 2)
the staging of the development (priority area to develop), and 3) the land owners social
relationship with the brokers, officials or community leaders. As an example, in PT Blue
River (Box 4.1), relatives of the mediator can get the highest price, while the other land
22Concerning infrastructure: electricity is available in this part of the village and water is not a problem
because wells are the main source for water.
owners, who are unaware of the current land price, get much less. "The art of
bargaining," is one of the talents a broker must have.23
According to the respondents' answers, brokers are selling land at much higher
prices than the original land owners. In 1993, the average price of direct individual sales
was Rp. 58.541/m2, while the price of sales made through brokers was Rp. 74,070/m2
(21% higher). In 1994, the price for direct sales was Rp. 59,048/m2, while sales made
through brokers was Rp. 103,610/m2. (See Appendix 5)
3.6.3 Social Relationships
Another reason why the average price of direct sales is lower is that these
transactions sometimes occur between neighbors or friends. It seems that social
relationships affect the land price. Six of the 24 respondents bought land in the same
village at a lower price than they sold to the developer. Generally, land owners always
sell their land at a lower price to local villagers.
The land owners in Rawa Buntu village (a village within Bumi Serpong Damai
new town yet to be purchased), told me that they would sell their land to local villagers
for Rp. 60,000 per m2 and to the developer for Rp. 80,000/m2. 24 I suspect that because
brokers are local villagers, they can buy land at a lower price. One broker admitted that
they usually put effort to gain the land owners' trust, so they can bargain and obtain lower
prices.
Of the 12 direct sales, two land owners put signs in front of their house, two
informed the lurah that they wanted to sell their land, two land owners offered their
neighbors the chance to buy their land, and one land owner was approached by a buyer.
23Interview with brokers.
24This land owner also said that if the highway company (PT Jasa Marga) offered to buy his land, he would
ask Rp. 500,000 per square meter. His rational was that the highway company would be making profit from
the toll fares. In his opinion, toll-highways are not public highways because people must pay to use it, and
small people like himself who use a pull cart are not allowed to go on the highway.
"Word of mouth" is how information on land for sale gets around. Brokers have their own
network and keep their information as confidential as possible. Several land owners
asked their neighbors for information on to whom to sell their land. Two land owners
asked their neighbors to sell the land for them. These situations show that land owners
typically lack enough knowledge and information to effectively sell their land.
3.7 Conclusion
Distorted land prices are largely due to lack of information among the actors
involved. The village head knows the future plans of the area and opportunity costs of
buying/selling land in his village. A knowledgeable and informed person such as the
village head, for example, gave higher land prices compared to less informed residents.
Unclear location permit boundaries' result in uncertainty among the prospective
buyers and sellers. This has made it difficult for informal as well as small scale formal
housing development to enter the market. It decreases the land supply, and increases the
land price to individual buyers.
Brokers had taken advantage of landowners lack of knowledge on land markets.
The brokers knew about the developers plan to acquire land, yet deliberately hid the
buyers identity from the land owner.
The lag time between land purchases in large scale developments allows
speculators to buy up the land. Then, as the land value increase, these speculators start
selling the land to the developer. Another possible reason for sudden increase of land
prices, is that as the villagers become more aware of the development and future land use
of their area, they also become aware of its opportunity costs. Thus, they become more
informed, have more bargaining power, and demand higher land prices.
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CHAPTER FOUR
INSTITUTIONS OF THE PERIPHERAL LAND USE CONVERSION
"In the information age, the ability to
manipulate and manage information is equated not only with power and
economic advantage, but also with developed nation status."
(Palmer, 1992)
One of the maj or findings in my research was that lack of information has created
a new area of commodity; in which brokers use their knowledge of the location permit as
a vehicle to gain huge profits. In this chapter, I will describe the relationship of the
institutions involved in the land use conversion, and it's linkage with information. I argue
that brokers have used the gap of lack of information to assist developers in obtaining
land. There are different degrees of brokerage, and to a certain extent land owners also
rely on brokers to negotiate their land transactions. Again, this is also due to the land
owners' lack of knowledge and information of their land rights, land markets, and future
opportunities.
4.1 Mechanisms of Land Acquisition
In the study area, the land transactions were a combination of transactions from
original landowners to households, original landowners-speculators-real estate
developers, original land owners-sub dividers-households and original landowners-real
estate developers. Unfortunately, these paths of land supply were not as clear cut as the
diagram that Hoffman prepared. (See Figure 4.1 and 4.2)
A major finding in the research was that the majority of land transactions were
conducted through brokers. Real Estate Indonesia confirmed that 90% of the land they
acquire goes through land brokers. This finding contradicts the regulation on land
acquisition that requires developers to negotiate and acquire land directly from the land
Figure 4.1 Paths of Land Supply
Original
Landowner
irst end Household Informal Investor/ Real Estate
Transfer . Subdivider Speculator Developer
Seond Land Household Household Informal Real Estate Household
ransfer Subdivider Developer
Third Land Household Household
Transfer
Source: Hoffman, et al. The M'arket for Shelter in Indonesian Cities (1990)
Figure 4.2 Chain of Land Transfers Observed
Original
Land Owner
Representative Repesenttative
direc I.Indirect
BROKER BROKER BROKER
First Landil %Household Real estate Household Investor/ Real Estate
T r- - --f-r-De v e lo p e r S p e c u la to r * D e v e lo p e r
BROKER BROKER
ESecond Landal Household Real Estate Household Household
Transfer 22%Developer
Third Land Household
Transfer
*Brokers are also referred to as mediators.
*Indirect land sales can involve a representative and a broker.
*Speculators often finance land acquisition without transfering the land title in their name.
owners. The degree of involvement of these brokers ranges from finding land and
identifying the land owners, to negotiating on behalf of the developers and sometimes, if
they are financed, assembling the land and holding the land for speculation.
4.2 Institutions in the Land Conversion Process
4.2.1 Brokers
Brokers have various degrees of involvement in the land acquisition project. A
number of activities were identified during field research:
. finding land for potential buyers
. obtaining information concerning the land owners, and boundaries of land ownership
. approaching the community leaders
. bargaining and negotiating with the land owners
. assembling land (if they are financed)
a. Who are the land brokers?
They can be a local villager, the sub-village head (jaro), relatives or close friends
of a local official, a community leader (tokoh masyarakat) or a motorcyclist (ojek). They
have a higher degree of knowledge and information concerning land markets, because
they are well informed of the villages plans.
Each broker has his own territory. In large scale land acquisition, they work
together, informing one another of their progress with a developer or of new areas under
location permits. According to one of the brokers I interviewed, this is a good system
because it allows each broker to obtain profit from his own territory. Some brokers work
individually, some work together with village leaders, some are employed by a developer,
some work on a contract basis with a developer, and some are financed by an investor
(land speculator).
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SOURCE: Pondok Aren Village Office
The village head is appointed by the local government, while the jaro is elected by the community through
the musyawarah process.
Figure 4.3 Structure of Village Community
b. How do brokers get their information?
Professional brokers usually hang around the village head's office, waiting for
inside information and prospective buyers. These brokers are local villagers. They know
the area very well and know most of the land owners. They depend on their connections
for information. Many of the brokers and village officials are related to one another. For
example, one of my surveyors is a distant relative to the village head of Pondok Pucung,
and Pondok Kacang Timur. He has several relatives working as sub village heads, who
sometimes act as mediators. Information of a development can easily spread through this
system of "word of mouth."
Another popular method of obtaining information on land for sale is through a
motorcyclist. These motorcyclists, called "ojeks", are one of the public transportation
modes in the villages. Because they travel around the villages, they know about pieces of
land for sale and development trends. Some ojeks have side jobs as brokers.
Information that a large developer requires land spreads quickly among brokers
and interested parties. These brokers take advantage of the unknowing land owners Small
land owners often are uninformed of the land markets because of their remote location
from the village office and activity centers. In several of the land transactions that I
recorded, these land owners asked the opinion of someone they knew and trust on land
prices. Many of these brokers use personal approaches, to gain the land owner's trust.
c. Fees and Commission
In urban areas, a broker's commission is 2.5 % of the sales price. The seller
usually pays the commission, but sometimes the buyer and seller may negotiate and split
the fees. In the urban fringe areas, brokers' commissions vary ranging from 1.6% to
100% of the land transaction price. As an example, one broker received a 2-5%
commission (he has been a mediator for about 9 years and his commission varies from
time to time, but on average it is about 2.5%). Another example is PT Blue River (see
Box 4.1 PT Blue River (fictive name)
PT Blue River built its first housing project in Tangerang in 1987. At that time they were joined
in a consortium under a different name. They wanted to extend their housing and obtained a
location permit to acquire 15 ha in 1990. They were able to buy 7 ha, but because of financial
problems in the main company, the physical development was delayed. The consortium broke
up in 1992, and they decided to continue the housing development on their own under a
different name: PT Blue River. They applied for a location permit under that name and received
a permit in March 1993. Up till the end of 1993 they have been able to build 100 units.
The land acquisition was done through a mediator, in this case an influential and respected
community leader (relative of the jaro). The developer and mediator signed an agreement, and a
price ceiling was fixed (Rp.14,000 per square meter). The reason why the developer used a
mediator, is because they could not identify who the landowners were and did'not want to spend
their time negotiating with the land owners. Also, since the mediator knew all the landowners, it
would be easier for him to approach and negotiate with the landowners.
The land transaction was held between the land owner and the developer. Two landowners
chose to exchange their land for another piece of land, instead of receiving cash. The developers
negotiated and agreed to exchange 60% of the land value, because they would use 40% of land
for infrastructure and social services, which is not considered as profit (this composition is
commonly used in land barters). The landowners finally found land further away from the
village at a much lower price. Despite receiving only 60% of land value, these land owners were
able to obtain bigger pieces of land.
Two other land owners were able to sell their land to the developer at the price ceiling, because
they were relatives of the mediator. In the other cases, the mediator bargained with the
landowners and was able to buy the land for Rp. 11,500 per m2. The mediator got the
difference of the price ceiling and the price agreed upon with the land owner. His total
commission was about 18.2% of the total price the developer paid to the landowners and for the
land exchange.
The developer also had to pay the official fees to the village head and camat office (5%), and
informal fees (5%) to the parties involved in the process-which amount to about 10% of the land
costs. In sum, if the land was bought at Rp.14,000 per m2 from the landowners, the total costs of
the developer to acquire the land were Rp.18,500 per m2 (30% higher). This does not yet
include the costs for acquiring the location permit, principal permit and converting the land
rights or obtaining building permits.
PT Blue River is planning to buy more land, but land prices have gone up. The land owners in
the surrounding area are asking Rp. 50,000 per square meter (end of 1993). The developer is
allocating Rp. 60,000 per m2 as the price ceiling. The land acquisition will begin early 1994. As
a comparison, the land price after development was Rp.175,000 (May 1993) and rose to
Rp.225,000 per m2 (December 1993). The developer plans to increase the sales price of land
every six months.
box 4.1). The mediator and developer agreed on a price ceiling, where the mediator
would get the difference of the negotiated price and the price ceiling. This mediator was
able to negotiate the land prices with the original land owners, and receive a commission
of 18.2% of the total land price paid by the developer.
The brokers I interviewed said that there is no standard rate on their commissions.
In large housing development projects, they operate based on the developers' priority
areas, and the price ceiling negotiated with the developer. They gain their profit by
bargaining with land owners, where the more uninformed the land owners, the more
profit they can get. Although two brokers would not reveal their commission, I was able
to ask them the land price they paid to land owners, and whom they sold the land to.
Both of them gave similar answers. I contacted the developer and was able to obtain the
average land price in Pondok Aren village for the years 1987, 1990 and 1993. By
comparing the figures from the brokers and the developers, I was able to estimate the
profit that the brokers made. In 1987, the price difference was 106% higher than the land
price to the land owners. In 1990, it was 60% and in 1993 it was 16.67%. (See Table 3.4)
4.2.2 Developers relation with brokers
Once a developer obtains the location permit, the next step is to survey the area
and make a map of land ownership in their area. Developers can afford to buy aerial
photographs or a base map of their location permit area from the national land office. The
developers would usually pay someone from the camat or village office to compile a map
of land ownership within the permit area.
The developers I interviewed admitted that it was more efficient to work with
brokers, rather than acquiring land by themselves. They do not have to spend too much
time in approaching the community in the different villages. For medium and large scale
developers, acquiring as much land as possible in a short time is crucial. As an example, a
permit area of 1000 hectares might consist of about 10-12 villages. Each village
comprises of about 6-8 sub villages consisting of several neighborhood clusters (see
figure 4.2) To acquire the first 500 hectares, the developer must approach about 10
village heads, 60 sub village heads and 600 land owners. Information on the land owners
are available at the village office, but limited to the names and area that the land owners
own. Village offices do not have maps that show the boundary of land ownership.
However, brokers are able to fill this gap of information by identifying and contacting
land owners.
A small developer said they use brokers only to identify the land parcels and land
owners, and introduce them to the village head. The developer then negotiated directly
with the land owners. Since it was a very small development (location permit 12 ha and
land acquired about 3 ha), there were only about 10 land owners approached. Another
small scale developer (PT Blue River-see Box 4.1) said that they didn't want to be
bothered with the process of negotiating with the community. "We don't want to spend
our time doing that, it will take too much of our time to approach and talk to them. We
think that using a broker that is familiar with the community is more efficient."
Developers often ask the sub-village heads (jaro) to inform the community of
their intentions. Sometimes the developers might approach a respected community fellow
(tokoh masyarakat), and ask them to inform the community of their intentions and
negotiate the land prices. In other cases, the sub-village head might already have a line
of brokers (relatives, close friends) waiting to start land acquisition. "Brokers assist the
process of obtaining land, it is speculators that are distorting the land market by
demanding extremely high land prices," said one developer. That developers use brokers
to obtain land is contrast to the location permit regulation that requires developers to
negotiate land prices and buy land directly from the land owners.
In large scale developments, after the first stages of acquiring land, the word
spreads around and brokers often approach the developer and offer their services. The
brokers have their own territory and know the community well enough. Developers make
use of these brokers. They would inform the brokers of the priority areas to acquire and
negotiate an agreement with these brokers.
These brokers (or often referred to as "mediators") would contact the land owners,
negotiate the price with them, and ask the land owners to come to the developer's office
to sign the transaction deeds and collect their money. Some brokers would go a step
further by collecting the girik letters (if a developer or an investor financed them) and pay
a down payment to these land owners.
4.2. 3 The Land Owners' View
For a developer, approaching and negotiating with the community usually means
only approaching the camat or the village head. Developers and brokers rely on the
assistance of these officials to contact the community. The approach is very top-down,
and varies per village. In one village, the village head contacted the sub village head to
discuss the intentions of the developer and let the sub village head inform the community
of the development. Afterwards the village head introduced the developer to the sub
village head and allowed the developer to negotiate directly with the community. In
another village, I found that most of the land owners were unaware that their land was
under a permit until brokers contacted them. The village head in that village had informed
the sub-village head, who then informed his friends (brokers) of this opportunity.
From the legal point of view of the location permit, the land owners' position is
very weak. First, there are no sections in the location permit regulation that describe the
land owners rights and second, the regulation excludes the community in the decision
making process. There is also no remedy if land owners are unwilling to sell their land,
except the option of participating in land readjustment.
From the interviews, I discovered that many land owners would ask someone they
trust to negotiate on their behalf. It can be the head of RT/RW (neighborhood cluster), the
jaro, or a community leader (tokoh masyarakat). The reason why they ask someone else
to represent them is because they realize that they do not understand the complicated
administration and procedures of land transactions. They understand that negotiating
through a mediator would involve a commission, and that is the price they must pay for
not being involved in the administrative procedures. Thus, the land owners' lack of
information on land transaction procedures and land rights, is a disadvantage.
The above described lack of information and transparency on land ownership, and
the unclear boundaries of the location permit, have supported land acquisition through
brokerage. Even in individual land sales, the tendency to involve brokers are great
because of the lack of information for both the buyer and seller. A buyer would want to
know which land is for sale and who owns the land, while a prospective seller would
want to know the current land market price and administrative procedures for selling
land. In the city, buyers and sellers can use the media (e.g., newspapers) or professional
broker to buy or sell land. The circumstances are quite different in the rural area. Many
land owners are unaware of the various mechanisms for selling land. In my interviews,
most land owners were approached by brokers. Several land owners informed their
neighbors of their intention to sell land, and two land owners put a sign in front of their
house. Land owners interested in selling land might inform the village head of their
intentions. The village head will pass the word to any one that stops by his office (many
of them brokers who hang out at the village head office).
Land owners who are relatives of local officials or brokers, have the advantage of
obtaining higher land prices. Thus, knowledge (information) and connections are the
bargaining power of land owners. A third factor that increases the bargaining power of a
land owner is whether the location of their land is within a developer's priority acquisition
area. Land owners located within priority areas of a developer's development, can resist
selling and demand higher prices for their land.
4.2.4 The governments view
Several officials at the local land office briefly stated their opinion that many
people tend to misunderstand the goals of the location permit and its implementation
conflicted with the civil law, but it was not their responsibility to monitor the land
acquisition process. Although the regulation states that developers should negotiate land
prices directly with the landowners on the basis of musyawarah (negotiation to reach an
understanding and decision among the community), the mechanisms for conducting
musyawarah have yet to be defined. Brokers in their opinion are disrupting the land
market, by pressuring land owners and demanding high prices to developers. Government
officials at the local land office consider that the land acquisition process is the
responsibility of the local officials (camat and village head).
The officials I talked to at the local land office were aware of the brokerage and
speculation in land acquisition, but consider those issues beyond their responsibility.
Some officials agreed with Harsono and Nasution, that there was a misperception on the
implementation of the location permit. Local officials at the village level are ambiguous
about the permit. On the one hand they feel that they must support the development and
are subordinate to the higher bureaucracy, on the other hand they must be of service to the
villagers. The permit has become a "surat sakti" (powerful letter). One village head said:
"They (the villagers) don't understand the importance of this new housing development."
This shows that village heads are already supporting developers.
As explained in section 4.3, the methods of approaching land owners vary and
depend on the initiative of the village leaders. One village head expressed his concern in
conducting musyawarah. Depending on the way it is conducted, the musyawarah process
can either be useful to disseminate the appropriate information to land owners or a
disadvantage to the land owners. He said that sometimes the developer only approaches
the camat, which then orders the village head to inform the community of the new
housing project and negotiate the land prices. Many of these informal meetings tend to
exhort the importance of the new housing development and stress the social function of
land, rather than explaining the rights and options of the land owners.
4.3 Conclusions
Brokers have been able to fill the gap of lack of information, bridging the
communication between land owners and developers. The lack of information on brokers'
fees and market land prices has enabled brokers to obtain huge amounts of profit from the
land transactions. Developers have used these brokers to their advantage in acquiring
land, since it is more efficient work this way. The lack of information on land owners and
their boundaries has made it impossible for developers to approach land owners directly.
Even though there is sufficient information on land markets, some degree of
brokerage is necessary. Brokers can have a legitimate role in development, as long as
information concerning land prices and their commissions are transparent. Given the
limited time and financial resources to acquire land in large scale developments, working
with brokers can be more efficient. 25
Government views brokers as opportunists, who are gaining huge profits by
suppressing land owners and demanding high prices to land owners. Their accusations
have not taken into account lack of information as the cause of this phenomenon and has
ignored the fact that it is partially due to the governments' own mechanism of issuing the
location permit. The government does not have the sufficient information to issue the
permit and has been unable to use the permit as a tool to control development. Lack of
information on registered land, land owners, sufficient maps and sound physical plans
hinders the operation of the permit.
25As a comparison, the land acquisition process for the development of the city of Columbia (14,000 acres)
in Maryland, involved half a dozen realty agencies, who bought land for James Rouse. The main purpose of
using brokers was to speed the land acquisition process. Each realtor was in charge of buying land in a
certain area. The identity of the buyer was kept a secret from the farmers, to avoid the sudden increase of
land prices. Rouse also set-up dummy corporations as camouflage. (Breckenfield, 1971)
CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSIONS
"Institutions affect human choice by influencing the availability of
information and resources, by shaping incentives, and by establishing the
basic rules of social transactions."
(Nicholson, 1988)
5.1 Theoretical Objectives and Practical Problems
During field research, I found many issues out of line from the intended goals of
the location permit. Lack of information on land markets, and weak institutions
complicate the implementation of the location permit. Some of the issues that I identified
are economic, planning, environmental, social and administrative consequences. In the
sections below, I will describe these effects and discuss whether the location permit has
reached its intended objectives.
5.1.1 Economic
5.1.1.1 Theory
Theoretically, the location permit gives a developer priority to acquire land in the
permitted area in a certain time period (maximum 2 years after the issuance of Pakto
2/1993), and there is no competition from other developers. However, this is not a
guaranteed right, because land owners have the option not to sell to the developer and
participate in a land readjustment scheme with the developer. The permit allocates land to
many developers in the housing industry. The government's rationale of issuing the
permits is to support housing development.
An official at BPN (National Land Agency) admitted that the location permit
gives a monopsonic position to the developer, however the new regulation has limited the
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In a related development, Public
Housing Minister Akbar Tanjung said
that as of April 1994 housing developers
Try Sutrisno
will not be allowed to conduct land
clecranc arcitis. Such activities
will be conducteckenlyb2'a state-owned
enterorise, he saica.
Ho did not name the enterprise but
hinted that it could be an entirely new
company. Tanjung said this policy
would constitute part of a govern-
ment ordinance to be issued in April
which would complement Law NoA/
1992 on the establishment of Kawasao
Sian Bagnun (Kasiba), meaning ready-
to-be-developed areas.
Kasiba will encompass designated
plots of land, roads, electricity .ines,
building permits and related necessi-
ties. Developers would only be aj-
lowed to build housing complexes in
sich areas and would not be free to
clear extra plots of land for other pur-
poses.
Obscrvers say that thC policy is de-
signed to prevent protest-dra\wing land
clearance programs, conducted by
arge-scale housing developers, from
recu-ring. It would also reduce- if
not climinate - the operations of land
speculators making fortunes while
ord inary people complain about insuf-
ficient compensation.
Onu the policy is implemented,
housing developers will have to buy
land from the appointed state-owned
Kasib. suthority.
The policy is to be implemented
nation-wide, meaning that the gov-
er-nment will have to provide a huge
amount of funds to compensate for
land cleared all across the country.
(EBF 1PA)
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Figure 5.1 Review Indonesia, January 29, 1994, page 22.
time to a maximum of two years. 26 He argues if there is no permit, the land market could
worsen as conglomerates buy up all the rural land. After the permit expires, the land
owners can sell to the market. On the other hand, many people believe that without the
location permit, small rural landowners would have the advantage of a competitive land
market because there would be more opportunities for other buyers to enter the market.
5.1.1.2 Practical Problems
a. Concentration of Land under A Few Permit Holders
Developers have found ways of acquiring large tracts of land. Developers
sometimes establish smaller companies that apply individually for permits less than 200
hectares (to avoid application to the Ministry). As a result, the majority of land under
location permits are concentrated in the hands of a few large developers. Hoffman and
Ferguson (1992) in their research on land regulations, found that ten large developers
dominate the formal housing industry in Indonesia. An article in Bisnis Properti 27 states
that Ciputra, the largest developer in Indonesia, has 15,000 hectares of land under
location permits. The total amount of land under location permits exceeding 500 hectares
is about 33,650 hectares.28 (See Appendix 1)
In the past decade, local governments have issued permits to larger scale
developers (>200 hectares), that cater to middle and upper income households. Several
other developers have been given location permits for "new town"29 developments such
as Tiga Raksa City (3000 ha), Gading Serpong (1,000 ha), Lippo Village (500 ha) and
Citraland Teluk Naga (1,000 ha) in Tangerang; Cikarang Baru (5,400 ha), Bekasi 2,000
26Since the time constraints just started October 1993, there is not yet evidence on its enforcement.
27Menguak Peta Bisnis Para Raja Properti in Bisnis Properti, February 1994, p. 6-7.
2 8Membatasi Luas Penguasaan Lahan Developer in Bisnis Properti, December 1993, p. 6-8.
29The term new town refers to the physical aspects of a town, and not administrative.
(2,000 ha), Lippo City (2,000 ha) and Royal Sentul (2,000 ha) in Bekasi. (See Figure 1.3
and Appendix 1)
b. Limits on Possible Market for Sellers
Hoffman and Ferguson's (1992) study suggested that the permit makes it difficult
for land owners to sell the local villager's land to a third party. Theoretically, the permit
gives the developer exclusive rights to obtain the land. Legally, all third parties must
obtain permission of the developer to acquire land and build within the location permit
area.
However, I found variations on the implementation of this regulation. In priority
areas of the developers land acquisition plan, land owners such as Pak Ali (see Figure
3.2) were unable to sell their land other than to the developer. Pak Ali's land is located on
the main street of a housing development. In another area within the developers' permit
(this information is also blurred because there were several versions of the location
permit boundary), I found land owners who had sub divided their land into lots (less than
1000 m2) and sold it to buyers other than the developer. These buyers were able to obtain
building permits from the local planning office and build their houses. The developers
were not concentrating their land acquisition towards that area, so it has neither been
approached by the developers or the brokers.
Villagers sell parts of their land to other villagers, who can easily build a house
without a building permit.30 Villagers also sell land to brokers, who speculate. Several of
the land transactions that I recorded in the same area went to a developer, as well as to
local villagers and outsiders.
30The building permit regulations are not enforced on local villager.
c. Excessive land held out of the market
Numerous studies have shown that the ratio of land acquired to total area under
the permit is low. The JMDPR report (1993) shows that developers in Botabek have only
been able to buy 35% of the land under their location permits. While statistics from BPN
show that 40% of the land licensed for development has been left idle. 31 Hoffman (1990)
recorded in his study of 502 housing developments in West Java, under BTN financing,
found that over 15,000 hectares of land was issued for housing projects through the
location permit (1983-1988), but only 4,000 hectares (27%) of land had been acquired by
mid 1988. This means that about 11,000 hectares of land is held off from the market.
On one hand the location permit appears to be assisting large developers as a tool
to assemble land. On the other hand, it is blocking urban development because
unacquired land is held off from the market (JMDPR, 1993).
Table 5.1 Developer's Acquisition of Land Under Location Permits
REGENCY AREA UNDER PERMIT LAND ACQUIRED RATIO
TANGERANG 575 locations 355 locations
28,219.6 ha 11,380.2 ha 40.3 %
BEKASI 255 locations 33 locations
4,358.4 ha 762.2 ha 17.5%
BOGOR 407 locations 127 locations
5,910.4 ha 1,399.6 ha 23.7 %
TOTAL BOTABEK 1,251 locations 522 locations
38,547.9 ha 13,570.5 ha 35.2 %
Source: JMDPR report, June 1993
d. Excessive location permits issued by the government
The amount of land issued under location permits exceeds the amount of land
projected for formal housing in the sixth five-year national plan (PELITA VI). The
projection of formal housing supply for 1994-1999 is 674,240 units, which requires about
31 Review Indonesia no. 94, 1/1994, p. 22.
20,277 hectares of land, while the total amount of permits issued for formal housing
development in Jabotabek is about 51,000 hectares. 32 This means that the location
permits issued in Jabotabek alone represent an over-supply.
The excessive location permits issued are not the fault of the developer. The local
governments' lack policies concerning housing demand. They issue permits merely based
on the amount requested by the developer. The local planning official that I interviewed
said that: "We will issue as many location permits as the land we have." His justification
was that because the Botabek area is a spill-over of Jakarta, it should provide land to
support housing development."
e. Exploitation made by lack of informed markets
According to Palmer (1991),3 information has been classified as an economic
resource. For many developing countries, the "economic development gap" has become a
"knowledge and information gap." Palmer based her argument on nations, but an analog
to the local economy can be drawn from her statement: "In the information age, the ability
to manipulate and manage information is equated not only with power and economic
advantage, but also with developed nation status."
The existing land market is a market that is biased towards developers and lacks
information transparency. Developers and middlemen have taken advantage of the land
owners lack of information. The land owners I interviewed were unaware that their land
was under the location permit until they were approached by the developer or their
mediators34. Only 4 of the 22 land owners knew about the land use plan in their area.
3 2Data from Membatasi Luas Penguasaan Lahan Developer in Bisnis Properti. December 1993, p. 6-8.
There are different sources of information on the area under location permits. According to Parlindungan,
the area issued under the location permit in Jabotabek is about 62,000 hectares. For further information read
AP Parlindungan. Tanah Terlantar dan Spekulasi in Bisnis Properti, December 1993, p. 28-29.
33Janet J. Palmer. Applying Information Technology to the Development Process in Urban and Rural
Development in Third World Countries. Edited by Valentine James. McFarland Publishers, 1991.
341n my interviews with brokers, they preferred to be referred to as mediators.
Landowners and villagers also lack knowledge of their land rights and administrative land
procedures. Several landowners commented that they didn't know the procedures of
paying land taxes and selling land. "I don't understand the system. It's done collectively
through the R W."
What we see in the land acquisition process is that information concerning land
markets and related issues are badly distributed. Many actors involved in the land
acquisition process have used the location permit as a vehicle to profit from. As an
example, knowledge that a certain developer has a location permit for a certain area
quickly spreads among brokers, but is kept a secret from the community. One broker said:
"We do our best to hide the identity of the buyer from the land owner." Brokers take
advantage of the local villager's perception of land prices that are based on social
relationships (see chapter 3 and 4). Land sales amongst local villagers are usually lower
than to outsiders, because of these social relationships.
Speculation also occurs in large scale developments among actors who have
advantage of information and financial resources. Made Yasa (1993) in his study on idle
land in Semarang, concluded that out of a sample of 52 idle parcels, 40 were used for
speculative intent and that the location permit was utilized for this purpose. One of the
factors that makes land holding an attractive investment is the low property tax, which is
only 0.1% of the assessed value.
f Additional costs created to the developer
All four developers I interviewed have said that although the location permit
gives them an exclusive right to buy rural land, it actually increases land acquisition costs.
"Knowledge of a location permit, rises land prices," said one developer. "We can buy
land much cheaper if there is no location permit. Since we can't buy land all at once,
many speculators buy up the land within the permitted area and hold them for higher
prices." Newspapers have been rampant with news that land prices are rising rapidly and
that cheap land for affordable housing is difficult to find, as well as news that landowners
are complaining about the compensation and below market land prices offered to them.
The rising land prices that land owners demand after developers start acquiring land, is
one of the reasons why these developers often buy land before they obtain the permit.35
g. Higher prices to the final consumer:
Although the new regulation has decreased some of the costs of obtaining the
permit, especially in shortening the length of time to obtain a permit, developers still
complain that there are informal costs and additional costs that they must bear. (See
chapter 3 on land prices) Middle men usually mark up the price to developers, and added
with the informal fees paid to acquire the land and register the land titles, development
costs, and final sales price, the final consumer ends up paying a very high price for the
development. The following table 5.2 shows the comparison of average land acquisition
price and final land price to consumer in a housing estate:
'Table 5.2 Comparison final consumer land price in Bintaro Jaya Estate (in nominal
rupiah)
1985 1987 1990 1991 1993
Average Land Acquisition Rp. 2,000 Rp. 9,500 Rp. 20,000 Rp. 25,000 Rp. 52,500
price
Final Land Price to home Rp. I 10,000 Rp. 160,000 Rp. 250,000 Rp. 350,000 Rp. 450.000
buyers
Table compiled by author from Panangian S. and associates, and interview with developer.
Even though developers complain about the land prices and additional costs
caused by the permit, the four developers that I interviewed all said that having a location
permit gives them an advantage in acquiring land. "Surat sakti" (powerful letter) is the
35Hoffman (1990) recorded that many developers buy land even before they apply for the location permit.
Interviews with developers pointed that the location permit adds additional costs such as informal fees to
officials and also attracts land speculation. See Chapter III on Land Prices.
term used to describe the location permit.36 The common perception is that with a
location permit, the developers already "control" the area; officials think that they must
support the new development; while the landowners' lack of information on future
development plans and land rights makes them subordinate in the whole process.
h. Inherent problems in administration
In areas within the location permit, some developers have complained that
speculators demand higher prices and can afford to wait until land prices have increased.
These speculators are often individual investors or companies that obtained permits, but
have no intention or no capability to develop the land. I found one company in my case
study area that had a location permit for more than 10 years without building a single
house. Some of these companies' permits are located within a larger location permit area
(interview with developer).3 7 The overlapping permits is an administrative problem due
to weak institutions, i.e., inadequate documentation of land ownership, and location
permits.
Other factors that complicate land acquisition are the low-rate of registered plots,
and fraudulent dealing. Most rural land owners have customary titles to their land (girik),
which are unregistered. The Ministry of Agraria administers land registration, while the
Ministry of Finance administers land taxation. This complicates the problem of an
inefficient land registration system.
Fraudulent dealing occurs when the someone sells land that they do not own. As
an example, in many villages, brokers pay a down payment to the land owners and then
36See also Bisnis Properti, January 1994.
37This situation mostly happens to developers with permits for large scale development, such as Bumi
Serpong Damai. When BSD obtained their permit in 1985, they encountered companies with land under
permits within their permit area. These companies have been unable to develop their land and yet, were
facilitated by the government in extending their permit.
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Figure 5.2 Jakarta Post, September 29, 199De.
While the regulation requires developers to avoid prime farmland, location permits are
issued in areas such as Teluk Naga, which is a productive rice area. The issuance of this
permit also conflicts with the intended zoning. (See Figure 1.3)L
hold the girik letters. He can sell the land to a speculator or a developer. The original land
owner becomes the victim.
In an interview with the village head of Pondok Aren, he admitted that one of his
sub-village heads Oaro) was holding the girik letters of the land owners. He had tried
persuading the sub-village head to return the girik letters, but all his attempts were in
vain. The land owners had given their girik letters to the sub-village who had promised to
take care of the land taxes, while the sub-village head had other reasons for holding their
letters. He was already informed of a developer seeking land and had personal interests to
become the mediator.
5.1.2. Land Use Planning
5.1.2.1 Theory
Theoretically, the location permit can act as a tool to control development. The
process to issue a permit involves coordination with and evaluation by relevant agencies
in planning i.e., the local planning office (Bappeda) and other relevant technical
departments such as public works (Dinas PU), agriculture (Dinas Pertanian), etc. This
review provides a mechanism for implementing local plans and assures that the new
development complies with zoning, infrastructure network and building regulations.
However, the local government has not been prepared for this new development.
Not all local governments have master plans (R UTR or pola dasar) for their district, and
if one exists it is often a broadly defined plan with no action plan. As a consequence, the
location permit is ineffective in achieving its objective to control development.
5.1.2.2 Practical Problems
a. Non-compliance with Land Use Zoning
Several studies have shown that the issuance of a location permits to a developer
does not assure that the actual land use complies with the intended zoning. Ferguson and
Figure 5.3 Pocket Housing Development
Pocket-shaped developments are most typical of small housing estates in the urban fringe.
Most land owners along main village roads are reluctant to sell their land. Developers are
unable to purchase all land within their location permit area, resulting in irregular shaped
site plans. The street pattern within the formal housing development is designed to
maximize the number of housing units.
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Hoffman (1992) identify several reasons for this. First, the planning capabilities of many
local governments are low, while the structure plan (pola dasar) only indicates rather than
specifies land use. Second, large formal-sector developers, in particular, frequently
influence government officials to change zoning. In examining zoning in Indonesia,
Bertaud (1989) considers zoning regulation as written rather than practiced by developers.
Table 5.3 Acquired Land in Location Permit Areas (Housing) and Compliance with
Zoning (1980-1989)
ACCORDING TO PLAN NOT ACCORDING TO TOTAL
KABUPATEN location Size locations Size locations Size
Bogor 2 16.4 ha I 3 ha 3 19.4 ha
Tangerang 108 14,965.2 ha 111 13,048.0 ha 218 27,114.2 ha
Bekasi 56 1,483.9 ha 68 1,235.5 ha 124 2,718.4 ha
BOTABEK 237 17,433.5 ha 245 15,808.8 ha 403 33,338.0 ha
Source: JMDP report, 1993.
b. Unclear permit boundaries
The ambiguous boundary of the location permit creates problems for rural land
owners. If officials assume that the villagers' land is within the boundary of a developer's
permit, they will have difficulty in selling their land to a third party. In addition, this
unclear boundary problem hinders the entrance of small scale housing development and
informal housing development.
c. Fragmentation of development and administrative agencies
The location permit is not supported by sufficient planning tools, such as
adequately scaled maps that show the existing condition and land use, nor by a detail
plan of the area that shows the infrastructure network. The existing plans (structure plan
or pola dasar) only indicate zoning with no specific details of the development. Sujana
(1993) identified that the problem of planning in Indonesia, is the tendency to neglect
urban management. Developers are left to design their own plan within the permitted
area.
Planning is fragmented and overlapped between the central government, local
government of DKI Jakarta and the kabupatens of the Botabek area, complicated by
weak coordination between the various agencies. In addition to the three regent
governments (kabupaten), there are municipal governments (kotamadya), and several
central government ministries and authorities involved in the Botabek development.
Decision and approaches to deal with the Botabek development are conducted partially
by the institutions involved. (Urban Fringe Area Report, 1993)
National projects in the urban fringe area such as the Soekarno-Hatta Airport,
Serpong Research and Technology Center in Tangerang, the new University of Indonesia
campus and Taman Mini Indonesia in Bogor are beyond the local government's authority
and not integrated with the planning of the surrounding areas, resulting in spatial
disintegration. Another example is that the Botabek's policy to designate residential areas
to accommodate population spill-over from DKI Jakarta, was abused by DKI Jakarta's
policy to develop new primary centers on the east and west side. (Urban Fringe Area
Report, 1993)
Developers have been constantly demanding an improved and integrated land use
plan. A larger proportion of their efforts are focused in land assembly, purchase
negotiations and land permit procedures, rather than construction and development.
d. Required housing mix not enforced
The location permit requires that the developers build mixed housing in a
proportion of high (1) : middle (3) and low (6). This requirement has not been fulfilled
by developers, which tend to build for middle and high income groups. In my interviews
with developers, they said that the regulation was "easier said, than done." Further
research should focus on why developers neglect this responsibility. For middle income
housing, affordability has also been a key issue. Developers are charging high land
prices, that has filtered many potential middle income families from owning a house.
This tendency has caused problems in finding land for low-income housing.
About 24,000 hectares of land in Tangerang has been allocated for housing
development-most of them are middle to high income housing. While the unclear
boundaries of the permit have created problems for informal housing development, land
for lower income housing is pushed further and further away. This adds costs to lower
income people for transportation and additional costs to the government to provide
infrastructure.
e. New government intervention in housing
Finding land for affordable housing is a key concern of the State Ministry of
Housing. On the basis of the presumption that land prices are sky rocketing, they are
preparing a new concept called kasiba (Kawasan Siap Bangun or ready to use area). The
basic concept is that the government (c/o a state enterprise) will decide a location for
kasiba, buys the land, draw the network plan and subdivisions, along with the local
government provide infrastructure, and sell the land to developers or cooperatives for
mixed income housing. The government will control the land prices within the kasiba.
Land owners who are not willing to sell their land must participate in a land
readjustment scheme. The main purpose of kasiba is to prevent land prices from rising
too fast and prevent land speculation.
Questions arise whether or not this degree of intervention will improve the land
supply for housing- most of the land is already under location permits. The government
has not conducted a study on why land speculation occurs or whether land prices are
increasing more than inflation.
Excluding walls surrounding kampungs
(village housing clusters) that are unwill-
ing to sell their land.
A small opening is provided for the
villagers' exit and entrance.
Cut and fill boundaries. Leveled land is
shown in front, while existing kampung is
shown in the rear.
View to new housing development from
the existing kampung.
Figure 5.4 Micro-morphological effects: types of boundaries between new housing
development and existing kampung (village housing cluster).
5.1.3. Morphological Consequences
5.1.3.1 Theory
Theoretically the local government should be able to guide and coordinate the
new development, since they issue principal permits and building permits. According to
Courtney (1983)38, although government approval is the main way to enforce controls,
many developing countries are unable to afford the luxury of a check and balance
process in their control procedures. It is a tedious process that requires local officials to
have sound knowledge of regulations, building, zoning codes and enforcement of
sanctions.
5.1.3.2 Practical Problems
As mentioned above, local governments are unprepared for the new
development. Local governments' issue permits, but are unable to control and monitor
them. Developers build housing and social facilities for the purpose of the new residents
only, and physically exclude the local villagers. The most obvious result of issuing
location permits that are not supported by a sound physical plan are micro-
morphological effects, such as uncoordinated street patterns, pocket type housing
estates, wall enclosures surrounding existing kampungs, and cut and fill boundaries.
a. Micro-morphological effects
1) Uncoordinated infrastructure and street pattern
Because there are no plans or guidelines for street and infrastructure networks,
developers must design their own street pattern, which are different from one another. In
one of the smaller housing sites I visited, the developers had built a wall surrounding their
38John Courtney. Intervention through Land Use Regulation in Urban Land Policies: Issues and
Opportunities. Harold Dunkerley Ed. A World Bank Publication, 1983.
Figure 5.5 "The New Berlin Wall"
This wall was built by a developer surrounding the land that they
purchased. The wall physically separates the new development from the
village and excludes the villagers.
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complex.39 Several of the roads just ended at a wall (dead end road). On the other side of
the wall was the backyard of houses from another complex. (See Figure 5.6)
2) Pocket shape development
I noticed that most land owners with land along the main road are reluctant to sell
their land. These landowners assume that land along the main road has a higher potential
value. One land owner who owned land along the main road, Pak Ali said that he didn't
want to sell his land to the developer, because he knew the land was worth more than the
price offered by the developer and that it had a higher opportunity cost.
This tendency of land owners not selling land along the main road has caused
pocket shape housing developments. A small developer said that their company couldn't
persuade the land owners along the main road to sell their land, and when they did sell it
was at a very high price. The developer could only afford to buy land enough for the site
entrance and exit. (See Figure 5.3)
3) Excluding walls around development
Developers define their territory by building walls around their land. In Pondok
Pucung and Pondok Aren Village, one developer built a wall along the main village road,
separating the village from the new housing estate. Villagers referred to this wall as the
"New Berlin Wall" . (see Figure 5.4 and 5.5)
4) Inclusive walls around uncooperative villages
Sometimes developers would build walls surrounding a kampung that does not
want to sell their land. The developers only leave a small opening for the villagers to
come in and out of the enclosure. Legally there is no regulation that prevents developers
39 Building a wall is a typical action for developers to define their property
Cleared land is shown in the fore-
ground. The wall in the rear surrounds
a cemetary.
A wall between two housing estates.
Uncoordinated street patterns and
wallsbetween housing estates are com-
mon. This is a dead end street. Notice
that the houses on the other side of the
wall are parallel to the wall.
Figure 5.6 Micro-morphological effects: more walls
from building walls surrounding their territory.40 Psychologically, the wall pressures land
owners into selling their land. Criticism towards this method has led developers to choose
other subtle methods in defining their boundaries, such as cut and fill boundaries. (See
Figure 5.5)
b. Macro-morphological Effects
Another consequence of the location permit is leap-frog development. Developers
cannot obtain all the land under the permit, because among others the land prices have
increased considerably since their initial development occurred. The price increase does
not attract other developers to enter the housing market in that area. Other developers
apply for location permits in areas further away, bypassing the area surrounding the first
development. Pockets of undeveloped land occur in between the developed areas. This
leap frog development causes inefficiency and costs to infrastructure development. The
local government must provide longer roads, piped water lines, electric lines, and
telephone lines.
5.1.4. Environmental Aspects
5.1.4.1 Theory
All previous regulations concerning the location permit had required an
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), flood level permit and land filling permit. The
location permit also requires that the development avoid prime farmland and utilize
unproductive farmland. The new regulation, Pakto 2/1993 omitted EIA in housing
projects, but still requires it for industrial estates. The possible rationale for omitting EIA
was that the government does not consider residential waste a threat to the environment.
40The "kavling" system (inherited from the Dutch), is the most common way of defining property. This
system allows the land owner to build a wall surrounding the lot.
ZONE 1
Avoid Urban Development
Characteristics:
* low lying coastal strip
* flat with poor drainage
* subject to flooding
* agriculture siuted to fishponds
* groundwater saline and undrinkable
* poor soil to build upon
* area affected by saline intrusion
ZONE II
Agricultural Intensification
Characteristics:
* low lying plains
e flat with poor drainage
* subject to flooding
* excellent rice growing. if irrigated
* groundwater fresh but easily
polluted
* poor soil to build upon
ZONE III
Major Urban Development and Agricultural
Intensification
* higher land rising from coastal plain
* reasonable gradient so good natural
drainage
* low flooding risk
* groundwater fresh and leaching soil
limits polution
* poor agriculture
* reasonable soil for building upon
ZONE IV
Limited Urban Development and
Agricultural Intensification
* steeper sloping zone
* good nataural drainage
* no flooding
* limited groundwater
* reasonable agriculture because
more rainfall
* reasonable soil to build upon
ZONE V
Upland Forest Plantations. Recreation
Conservation and Avoid Agricultural
Intensification
* steep mountain zone
* rapid runoff although limited by
vegetation
* natural forest areas
* agricultural limited to complicated
terrace constructions
* subject to rapid erosion if forests are
cleared
Figure 5.7 Jabotabek Physical Constraints
The additional permits (EIA, flood and land filling) are not a condition to obtain
the location permit, but are a requirement to obtain a building permit. Thus, it seems that
environmental aspects are not controlling the macro-development, but are considered
elements of the micro-development. The consequence of requiring EIA for building
permits is that the local government can restrict new development to medium and low
density housing. This also means that low-income housing is further restricted because
low income housing has a higher density than medium and high income housing.
5.1.4.2 Practical Problems
a. Decrease offarm and crop land
The amount of farmland declines as more rural land is converted into urban use.
The amount of farm land per person in Java has declined from 0.5 ha in 1990 to 0.3 ha on
1993.41 Inconsistency with master zoning has also caused environmental problems. The
Jabotabek development is constrained to limit its use of ground water in zone I, II and III
(see figure 5.8). The ground water in Northern Jakarta is already infiltrated with salt
water. Consequently, issuing permits for housing in these zones are a threat to the ground
water level.
For example, Teluk Naga, a productive rice area located in the northern part of
Tangerang, has been designated for tourism development. The developers obtained
location permits to develop about 1,500 hectares. The villagers are worried about the land
use change because their main income is from rice production. Although the Ministry of
Agriculture has disapproved the conversion of this area for urban use, the local
government still issued location permits for this development. (See Figure 5.2 and 5.8)
4 1Lowering the Boom on Speculators in Review Indonesia, January 29, 1994, p. 22.
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Figure 5.8 Jakarta Post, May 8, 1992.
b. Illegal landfill
The local government has warned several developers to remove soil from ponds
throughout Tangerang. Out of the 42 ponds in Tangerang, only 19 are still functioning as
water sources for irrigation, fisheries, drinking water and recreation. The other 23 ponds,
which amount to about 304 hectares, have become dry land. (See Figure 5.8)
5.1.5 Social impacts
5.1.5.1 The illusion of jobs
The technical bias of projects is common in developing countries (Cernea, 1985).
Due to this bias, many projects tend to neglect social aspects. There are two strong views
concerning social impacts of housing development. One view is that the new housing
development provides job opportunities in the community and the villagers can use the
social and public facilities provided by the new development. 42
The other view is that the land owners are becoming poorer. With less land, and
no skills to work in the non-agricultural sector, these land owners end up poorer than
before. (Katjasungkana, 1989) A few developers provide jobs for the villagers, but many
village community leaders had to fight for those jobs. As one community leader said:
"The developer promised us jobs when we were resettled here, but all the young people in
my village were rejected when they applied for the jobs. They said these people lacked
education and skills required for the jobs. I went to see the developers and insisted that
they keep their promise to provide jobs. Finally they did."
5.1.5.2 Exclusion and change of living style
In terms of physical development, villagers are isolated from the new
development by concrete walls. Most of the social facilities built by the developers are
42Interview with developer (December, 1993).
Figure 5.9 Drainage from housing estates flows into local ditches, which are
not designed to accomodate heavy water flows.
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not benefiting the villagers, because they cater to the higher income community. One
villager commented: "I can't use any of the sports facilities in the new housing
development. They are all expensive sports. I don't play golf or tennis, and I don't like
the mall. I'm worried that my children will become victims of consumption. They hang
out at the mall almost every day." As one village head said, "This new development
(malls, golf courses) is not our life style." Until the end of 1992, there were at least 21
golf courses in the Botabek area. (Dorleans, 1992)
5.1.6. Administrative Consequences
5.1.6.1 Theory
Other issues that should be considered in the implementation of the location
permit, are the capacity of the local government, and the involvement of the sub district
office in deciding what kinds of public facilities are mostly needed in the village. The
local governments' capability is crucial because there are many value judgments involved
in the location permit process that depends on the officials' intellectual capacity to
analyze the justifications for the decisions.
5.1.6.2 Practical Problems
a. Misperception of regulations
Harsono (1991) argues that, "In practice there is a misperception on the essence
and function of PMDN regulation no. 15/1975 and 2/1976, as if these regulations give
legal foundation and regulate everything concerned with land release and land
acquisition." Theoretically, these regulations are only administrative products for internal
use among the institutions involved in the permit process. All land acquisition and land
release procedures should follow the perdata (civil) law, i.e., the agreement law (hukum
perjanjian), which states that both parties (buyer and seller) are on equal terms. Both
parties have the right to refuse or accept any terms offered to them.
Several officials at the local level bureaucracy agree with Harsono on the
misinterpretation of the location permit regulation. The fact that the actors involved in the
process have unequal information concerning land use plans, land rights, obligations and
land prices, has worsened this situation. Ferguson and Hoffman (1992) stated that village
heads tend to exhort land owners on the importance of land as a "social function." In my
interviews with one of the village heads, he also gave a similar remark: "The villagers do
not understand the importance of the housing development."
b. Overlapping of permit areas
Deficiencies of skills complement the weakness of local institutions, and hinder
efficient land administration and land management. Besides the unclear boundaries
mentioned above, overlapping of permit areas complicate the problem. Figure 3.2 shows
that several location permits are located within a larger permit area.
c. Non-enforcement of sanctions
Developers have little responsibility to follow housing regulations, mainly
because the government has not strictly enforced sanctions. In my interviews with
government officials, they said that enforcing sanctions is difficult because the regulation
doesn't explain what the sanctions are and the local government hasn't prepared any
implementing regulations that complement the location permit. On the other hand,
developers often use their "power" and connections with the higher bureaucracy to obtain
permits and/or extensions.
d. Lack of coordination with village officials
The PMDN 3/1987 states that developers must build social and public facilities
for the people living within the housing development. Therefore, this stresses the needs of
the future home buyers rather than the existing community. Furthermore, the description
of social and public facilities in the local master plan (Rencana Umum Tata Ruang,
issued by Bappeda) is vague. As an example, the plan only lists "sports facilities," and
does not specify what kind of sports facility should be built or whether the decision to
build a sports facility should involve asking the community what they need. The new
development tends to ignore the existing community.
e. The ambiguous role of local village officials
Local village officials are faced with the ambiguity of serving the community and
being subordinate to the higher bureaucracy. Many village heads believe that they must
support the new development, yet they must be of service to the villagers.
f Conflict with new concept of kasiba
According to the PMDN no. 5/1974, the local authorities should prepare
development plans and control local development. Basuki (1992) states that the level of
control should have included monitoring the land acquisition process, protecting the land
owners' rights as well as enforcing obligations of the permit holder. In practice, the
permits are issued more as an administrative procedure, rather than as a tool to control
development. The failures of the location permit to reach its intended goals in providing
housing and affordable land has given the government a strong reason to intervene with
new concepts of land management. The government is planning a new concept called
kawasan siap bangun or kasiba (ready to use sites). Perum Perumnas will be responsible
for implementing kasiba.
I argue that shifting the responsibilities of land allocation and development to a
central government agency, appears to weaken the role and responsibilities of the local
government. The local planning office in Tangerang has admitted that they have been
slow in preparing themselves to accommodate the new development, however they are
now preparing a detailed plan for their area, which will be ready by September 1994.
With these new plans, the local planning office hopes to achieve a better coordinated
development.
5.2. Recommendations
Although my analysis suggests many possible improvements, the central and most
important issue is that the government should improve and increase the level of
information on land regulations and land markets.
. The government should improve land administration and decentralization- improve
cadastrals, simplify and localize land registration at the kecamatan level. These
measures will increase the number of registered plots and ease the local land owners
in administration procedures. If each village has a detailed map of the land owners
and their land boundaries, the process of selling and buying land will be much easier.
- Disseminate information to the land owners and increase information on land prices,
commission and fees of brokers. Inform land owners of their land rights, explain their
options in the land conversion process, and inform them about future land use plans.
. Clarify the process of negotiating with land owners (musyawarah). Is it enough to
discuss plans with the community leaders or should all the land owners be informed
and involved in negotiations with the developer? Expand the level of information to
be discussed in the process, such as land owners' rights, developers' obligations, and
options for participating in the new development.
. Clarify the boundaries of the location permit and provide this information to local
officials, developers and land owners.
. The government should increase the flow of information concerning land regulations,
land-use planning and development plans within government agencies through
training, short courses, and newsletters; and to the public, through the media:
television, newspapers, magazines, etc. This information would also include expose
of non-complying developers, and problems of government administration in land and
planning. More information on land issues will increase people's understanding of
their land rights, obligations and future opportunities.
In addition to the above recommendations to improve the information system,
the goverment might incorporate the following recommendations:
. Many of the land owners sold their land for financial reasons. The government
should extend credit to small land owners and provide technical assistance to land
owners to enable them to shift to the non-agricultural sector. This will help the local
villagers' absorption into the urban job market generated by new housing
development.
. The government's planning efforts should focus on the existing villages and pockets
of unacquired land between housing developments. Although the location permit
regulation proposes the concept of land readjustment, developers deny the
responsibility to implement the scheme. The government should clarify the concept
and procedures of land readjustment.
- Prepare integrated land use plans, that include road and infrastructure networks.
Coordinate the plans with the overall Jabotabek development and existing carrying
capacity of land in Botabek.
5.3 Future Research Questions
5.3.1 The Necessity of the Location Permit
From a legal point of view, the PMDN 3/1987 and Pakto 2/1993 appear to give
emphasis on the economic side of development. Land appropriation is different from
voluntary bargain and sale. The land appropriation regulation (PMDN no. 15/1976 and
16/1976) fails to recognize the rights of small land owners. Further research should focus
on the necessity of the regulation and how new land regulations can accommodate the
rights of small land owners.
The land owners' options stipulated in the land appropriation regulations are
limited and unclear. If the government should decide to continue using these regulations,
policies for improving the system should also include further discussion of options for
land owners. Is it possible to offer partnerships, such as community land trust, land
cooperation, etc.? If yes, further research should study how can the government assist the
villagers in setting up small scale enterprises or coops, and other possibilities for
partnerships in development.
5.3.2 The Role of the Community
What is the role of community participation in the development process? The
location permit and the process of land appropriation excludes the community in the
decision making process. Land appropriation committees only involve local government
officials- none of the land owners are represented. This situation creates opportunities to
abuse the regulation. The government should include disseminating information on land
rights in their guided land development program.
5.3.3 The Social Function of Land
The government should define the meaning of "social function". What kind of
development is considered a social function and how does it effect the local community?
Land alone cannot be considered a social function, if it is not supported by a social plan
that explains the benefit of the new land development to society as a whole. Should a
social project mean that the land owners are compensated at below market price? The
current view that housing is a social function is too broadly defined. Many formal
housing developments cater to upper middle income people and provide luxury facilities
such as golf courses, and shopping malls.
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5.3.4 Planning Issues
a. Decentralization Vs centralized planning
Officials at the central government argue that the rationale for centralized
planning is that local governments are incapable of designing and implementing their
own plans. On the other hand, if planning was centralized, local governments would
never have the experience to develop their area. Further research should focus on the
prerequisites and boundaries of the two planning views. In what way can local
government have a larger role in planning? What kinds of mechanisms are required to
enable both local and central governments to have proportional roles in development?
b. Planning Devices
Since traditional planning is expensive, time consuming and often not
implemented, what kind of planning devices are possible? Other countries such as the
USA is experimenting with performance zoning, where decisions for new development
are decentralized to the local level. 43 The government should study these measures. A
detailed plan of an area combined with enforcement of performance zoning would
eliminate the necessity for a location permit.
c. The Nature of Demand in Jabotabek
Various studies have shown that there is an excessive amount of land under
location permits and as a result there will be an oversupply of housing in the future. Yet,
local land offices are still issuing location permits. Further research should focus on these
new housing developments. What is the nature of the overall housing demand in the
Jabotabek area?
4 3According to Douglas Porter (1988), performance zoning exercises to some extent performance-based
criteria and standards to determine appropriate uses, and provides administrative mechanisms to offer more
predictable and consistent decisions.
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Table I Developers with Location Permits > 500 ha
Source: Bisnis Properti, December 1993, page 8
~DEVELOPER PER UMAHAN
"YANGMENGUASAI LAHAN DI ATAS500OHa
1. PT. PancaWiratama Sakti (Tigaraksa) j3.800
2. Bumi Serpong Damai 6.000
3. PT. Citra Land Teluk Naga 1.000
4. PT. Bintaro Raya 1.700
5. PT. Citraland Surabaya 1.500
Pantai Indah Kapuk 800
7. PT. PutraAlvitaPratama (Bekasi2.000) 2.000
8. PT. Metropolitan (Tangerang) 700
9. PT. Alva Gold Land 700
10. LippoCity 800
11. LippoVillage(Tangerang) 700
.12. PT. SerasiNiagaSakti 500
13. PT. SimasTunggal 500
14. PT.AranggaPertiwi 500
15. PT. BhinekaKarya 500
16. PT.AnekaKarya 650
17. PT. SupraVarietas 700
18. PT. Apta Citra 600
19. PT.Nirmalalndah 500
20. PT. Modemland Realty 700
21. PT. Kapuk Naga lndah 2.000
22. PT. Tunggal ReksaKencana 500
23. KotaCikarang Baru 1.400
24. Rancamaya 550
25. RoyalSentul . 2.000
26
. AgrowisataNusantara 700
27. BukitCinerelndah 650
28. PT.Jakarta BaruCosmopolitan 1.000
Jumlah a p
Sumber : Pusat Data Bisnis Properti
Table 2 List of Projects and Land under Location
Permits of Ciputra (Sang Pelopor)
Source: Bisnis Properti, February 1994, page 11
.. ,YE DA IASA AA
GROUP SANG PELOPOR LUAS AREA
A. BUMISERPONGDAMAI
1. B S D 6.00,00 ha
B. CIPUTRA GROUP
1. Citra Garden l,,11,Daan Mogot 430,00 ha
2. PT.CiralandSurya(SurabayaBarat) 1.500,00 ha
3. PT.KaryaAndarila(Semarang) 2,00 ha
4. PT.CitraiandSentra(Jakarta) 4.13 ha
5. SegitigaEmasCitraland,Kuningan 13,50 ha
6. CitralandEstateKawsn.Indus.Neglasari,Tangerang 500,00 ha
7. CitraGarden Grand City, CiralandTelukNaga 1.000,00 ha
3A49,63 ha
C. METROPOLITAN GROUP
1. KosambiBaru 15.00 ha
2. HarapanBaru 25,00 ha
3. PT.KawasanindustiJababeka(Cikarang) 510,00 ha
4. KotaCikarangBaru, PT.GrahaBuanaCikarang 1.400,00 ha
5. BekasiMetropolitan Mal 11,50 ha
6. Kalibaru, BekasiBarat 72,50 ha
7. MedanSatria,BekasiBarat 41,90 ha
8. WismaMetropolitan,1, I1,1ll, PT. Jakarta Land 7.00 ha
2.082,90 ha
D. JAYAGROUP
1. BintaroJaya 1.700,00 ha
2. TamanImpianJayaAncol 250,00 ha
3. Garden ResidenceKemangJaya 5.40 ha
4. SundaKelapaJayaHarbour, PT.JayaRealProperi 12,00 ha
1.967,40 ha
E. PONDOKINDAH GROUP
1. Pondoklndah
(PT.MetropoltanKencanadenganSIPPTtahunl972) 450,00 ha
2. Purilndah (PT.AntilopeMaju) 180,00 ha
3. BukiCinerelndah 60,00 ha
4. PantaiIndahKapuk (PT.MandaraPermai) 1.000,00 ha
5. ShangrilaGardenBatam 10,40 ha
6. Park Royale, PT. SariLembahTitaHijau 6,50 ha
1706,90 ha
Sumber:Data Propert indonesia/Bine
PERBANDINGAN PENGUASAAN
LAHAN PARA DEVELOPER
:5
Figure 1 Comparison of
Area under Location Permits
issued to Developers
Source: Bisnis Properti,
February 1994, page 6
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Appendix 1 Land under Location Permits
Note:
Beginning 1991, the land prices are divided by village.
Only Pondok Aren and Pondok Pucung village are included in this table. An example of
the official price issued by the bupati (regent) of Kabupaten Tangerang can be seen on the
following page.
Appendix 2 Official Land Prices in Kecamatan Pondok Aren (1987-1993)
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Land Use and 1987 1988 1990 1991* 1993
Land type
Village: Pd. Aren Pd.Pucung Pd. Aren Pd. Pucung
Farming
class 1 15,000 17,500 17,500 15,000 14,000 16,000 14,500
class II 12,000 14,000 14,000 13,000 12,000 13,500 13,000
class III 7,500 10,000 10,000 10,000 9,000 11,000 9,500
class IV 6,000 7,000 7,000 7,000 6,000 8,000 7,000
Class V 3,500 4,000 4,000 6,000 5,000 7,000 6,000
Housing
Class I 50,000 60,000 60,000 40,000 30,000 57,500 35,000
Class II 37,500 45,000 45,000 30,000 20,000 50,000 27,500
Class 111 20,000 30,000 30,000 20,000 15,000 30,000 22,500
Class IV 12,500 15,000 15,000 15,000 10,000 22,500 15,000
Commercial/
Trade
Class I 50,000 60,000 60,000 N/A N/A 75,000 40,000
Class II 35,000 45,000 45,000 70,000 35,000
Class III 22,500 30,000 30,000 47,000 30,000
Class IV 12,500 15,000 15,000 30,000 20,000
R s e I. I v e
2s 12 W- r. s
gn s' 2 8aN rt sraV- I V f
sit ss 2  666 2n i
.; A. . . . C, . W . jV
_______ _______ %C\
H 8 %
3. 1q.q
9.9 OZ9
I 0%
I.,
Cn- 6A
I -~
4
Appendix 3 Official Land Prices in Kabupaten Tangerang (1990)
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* Land transactions in Pondok Pucung village
0 Land transactions in Pondok Aren village
Appendix 4 Location of Land Transactions Recorded in Case Study Area. The numbers
correspond to the code in Appendix 5.
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NO CODE. YEAR AREA PRICE LAND LAND BUYER BROKER
M2
RP./M2 STATUS TYPE
1 A6 1980 1,000 5,000 girik darat2 developer yes
2 A3 1984 1,200 6,000 girik sawah developer yes
3 Al 1990 500 6,000 girik sawah individual no
4 A5 1992 1,000 65,000 girik darat2 developer yes
5 A9 1992 200 75,000 girik darat2 individual yes
6 A2 1993 200 25,000 girik darat2 individual no
7 A4 1993 160 120,000 HGB daratl individual no
8 A8 1993 300 60,000 girik darat2 individual yes
9 All 1993 265 90,000 girik daratl individual yes
10 A13 1993 200 60,000 girik darat2 individual no
11 A14 1993 400 50,000 girik darat2 individual no
12 A7 1994 200 65,000 girik darat2 individual yes
13 A10 1994 745 125,000 girik daratl individual yes
14 A12 1994 200 60,000 girik darat2 individual no
15 A15 1994 120 50,000 girik sawah individual yes
16 A16 1994 600 60,000 girik darat2 individual no
NO CODE YEAR AREA M2 PRICE LAND LAND BUYER BROKER
RP./M2 STATUS TYPE
1 P4 1987 3,800 8,000 girik darat developer no
2 P5 1987 2,000 7,500 girik darat developer yes
3 P1 1990 2,000 15,000 girik darat developer yes
4 P2 1990 3,000 15,000 girik sawah developer yes
5 P7 1990 1,000 25,000 girik darat developer no
6 P3 1992 700 35,000 girik darat individual no
7 P8 1992 1,300 30,000 girik darat developer no
8 P6 1993 400 30,000 girik darat individual no
Note:
Sawah = paddy fields
Darat 1 = dry land 1
Darat 2 = dry land 2
Appendix 5 Land Transactions in Pondok Pucung and Pondok Aren Village
109
Land Prices in Pondok Aren Village
(in nominal rupiah)
1987 Lurah Broker1 Broker2 Broker3 Developer
Dryland 1 45,000 5,000 6,000 5,000 11,000
Dryland 2 25,000 4,000 5,000 4,500 n/a
Paddy field 8,000 3,500 4,000 3,500 8,000
1990 Lurah Broker1 Broker2 Broker3 Developer
Dryland 1 75,000 45,000 15,000 15,000 22,000
Dryland 2 35,000 40,000 12,500 12,500 n/a
Paddy field 12,000 15,000 10,000 10,000 18,000
1993 Lurah Broker1 Broker2 Broker3 Developer
Dryland 1 120,000 80,000 50,000 55,000 57,000
Dryland 2 50,000 65,000 45,000 45,000 n/a
Paddy field 40,000 45,000 40,000 40,000 50,000
Land Prices in Pondok Aren
(in real rupiah)
1987 Lurah Broker1 Broker2 Broker3 Developer Mean
Dryland 1 72,173 8,019 9,623 8,019 17,642 23,095
Dryland 2 40,096 6,415 8,019 7,217 15,437
Paddy field 12,831 5,613 6,415 5,613 12,831 8,661
Mean 41,700 6,683 8,019 6,950 15,237
1990 Lurah Broker1 Broker2 Broker3 Developer Mean
Dryland 1 97,314 58,388 19,463 19,463 28,545 44,635
Dryland 2 45,413 51,901 16,219 16,219 32,438
Paddy field 15,570 19,463 12,975 12,975 23,355 16,868
Mean 52,766 43,251 16,219 16,219 25,950
1993 Lurah Broker1 Broker2 Broker3 Developer Mean
Dryland 1 120,000 80,000 50,000 55,000 57,000 72,400
Dryland 2 50,000 65,000 45,000 45,000 51,250
Paddy field 40,000 45,000 40,000 40,000 50,000 43,000
Mean 70,000 63,333 45,000 46,667 53,500
Appendix 6 Nominal and Real Land Prices in Pondok Aren Village
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Land Price Range (1987)
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Appendix 7 Price Ranges for Different Land Types in Real Rupiah (1987, 1990 and
1993)
111
100,000
90,000
80,000
70,000
60,000
50,000
40,000
30,000
20,000
10,000
0
120,000
100,000
80,000
60,000
40,000
20,000
0
Dryland 1
Dryland 2
Paddy field
a)
0
0
Row 2 Dryland 2
15437 Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard Devia
Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count
#N/A
7618
#N/A
16452
270684393
4
2
33681
6415
40096
61748
4
Row 2 Dryland 2
Row 3 Paddy Field
8661
1709
6415
12831
3821
14597986
-3
1
7217
5613
12831
43304
5
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard Deviati
Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
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Maximum
Sum
Count
Row 3 Paddy field
32438 Mean
#N/A Standard Error
30816 Median
16219 Mode
18914 Standard Deviati
357757063 Variance
-5 Kurtosis
0 Skewness
35682 Range
16219 Minimum
51901 Maximum
129752 Sum
4 Count
Row 2 Dryland 2
Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard Devia
Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count
51250 Mean
#N/A
47500
45000
9465
89583333
3
2
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard Deviati
Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
20000 Range
45000 Minimum
65000
205000
4
Maximum
Sum
Count
Appendix 8 Descriptive Statistics for Different Land Types (1987, 1990 and 1993)
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Dryland 1
23095 Mean
1987
Row 1
Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard Devia
Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count
1990
Row 1
12398
9623
8019
27724
768612915
5
2
64154
8019
72173
115477
5
Dryland 1
Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard Devia
Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count
44635
14984
28545
19463
33505
1122599574
1
1
77851
19463
97314
223174
5
Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard Devia
Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count
16868
2010
15570
12975
4495
20202752
-1
1
10380
12975
23355
84339
5
Row 3 Paddy Field
1993
Row 1
Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard Devia
Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count
Dryland 1
72400
12972
57000
#N/A
29005
841300000
2
2
70000
50000
120000
362000
5
43000
2000
40000
40000
4472
20000000
0
1
10000
40000
50000
215000
5
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